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Josep Pujol Andreu2 
Carlo D’Ippoliti3 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
A growing body of literature focuses on the relationship between life expectancy and 
GDP per capita. However, available studies to date are overwhelmingly based on either 
cross-country or cross-sectional data. We address the issue from a novel, more 
historically grounded approach, i.e., comparing long-run consistent time series.  
 
OBJECTIVE 
To investigate what, if any, is the causal link between life expectancy and GDP. 
 
METHODS 
We provide consistent and updated long-term yearly time series of GDP and life 
expectancy for Italy and Spain and compare them with those available for France. 
 
RESULTS 
Both Italy and Spain converged towards the European core (France) earlier in life 
expectancy than in GDP. We find it necessary to split the series into two sub-periods, 
and we find that, in general, both improvements in life expectancy cause GDP growth 
and economic growth causes improvements in life expectancy. For the countries and the 
periods considered there are, however, exceptions in both cases. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our findings confirm the hypothesis of a non-monotonic relationship between life 
expectancy and income, but they also emphasize the importance of empirical 
qualifications, imposed by the historical experience of each national case.  
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1. Introduction  
There is a growing literature on the relation between improvements in life expectancy 
and the rise in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The subject is of the utmost 
interest to economists, demographers, and policymakers (at least in the developed 
countries, which are experiencing an ageing population and sluggish economic growth). 
A well-established causal link goes from income to life expectancy. According to 
Preston (1975), the relationship between GDP and life expectancy in the 20th century 
follows a logarithmic curve. The impact of GDP on life expectancy is higher when the 
former is low, then it decreases as GDP rises, and even disappears after GDP reaches a 
certain threshold. While this relationship is widely accepted in the literature4 there is no 
consensus on the opposite causal link, going from life expectancy to income.  
In economics, the unified growth theory holds that the demographic transition 
plays a crucial role in initiating the shift from stagnation to growth (Galor and Weil 
2000; Galor 2012): The idea is that with the demographic transition, higher life 
expectancy leads to lower fertility and lower population growth, and thus to higher 
returns of human capital investments to those living longer. In turn, lower fertility and 
higher human capital both contribute to the rise of per capita GDP. A number of cross-
country studies find a positive effect of life expectancy, or a negative effect of 
mortality, on income per capita (Bloom and Sachs 1998; Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 
1999; Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg 2008), but the debate is still ongoing. For 
example, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) find no impact of life expectancy on GDP per 
capita, and their explanation is that increased life expectancy actually accelerates 
population growth. More recent studies suggest that the causal effect of life expectancy 
on growth is non-monotonic, i.e., it is negative but insignificant before the onset of the 
demographic transition, and positive afterwards (Cervellati and Sunde 2011).  
All these studies are based on cross-sectional comparisons. By contrast, here we 
aim to exploit new and updated time series in order to investigate the issue from a 
historical perspective. We use updated long-run estimates of life expectancy and GDP 
for Italy and Spain (1861‒2008) and compare them with the available corresponding 
series for France. Indeed, the development and employment of these long series − an 
approach that can be regarded as complementary to cross-sectional comparisons − is in 
itself one of the main contributions of our work. In macroeconomic history, two 
approaches are the most popular on quantitative grounds: cross-country studies, often 
                                                          
4 Of course, income is not the only factor affecting life expectancy. For a broad and updated review of the 
determinants of the rise in life expectancy and the reduction in mortality during the 20th century – with an 
empirical focus on the Spanish case – and more references to the international studies investigating the link 
from income to life expectancy, see Pérez Moreda, Reher and Sanz Gimeno (2015: 287‒367). For a more 
general account of the mutual dependency between economic growth and civil development, see Zacchia 
(2016).  
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using cross-sectional data, and country-specific studies, usually employing time series. 
In cross-country studies the data at hand is typically limited to a few benchmark years 
or to short periods of time. Although a wide range of countries and indicators may be 
included and discussed, the lack of time series may prevent these studies from dealing 
efficaciously with endogeneity, even when instrumental variables are introduced, while 
heterogeneity or even inconsistency of the data used may be overlooked. Time-series 
macroeconomic analyses of specific countries or regions are of course much more 
complete in historical coverage and at times take advantage of refined estimates,5 but 
this may be detrimental to international comparisons.6 A combination of the two 
methods has also been used for international comparisons7 and in specific country 
studies. For instance, limited to the Spanish case, Pérez Moreda, Reher, and Sanz 
Gimeno (2015: 292–299) compare GDP per capita and life expectancy/mortality in the 
long run by making use of both yearly series (at the national level, from 1901 to 1990) 
and cross-sectional data (at the regional level, in four benchmarks corresponding to the 
1860s, 1900‒1901, 1930‒1931, and 1961), even though they only estimate simple 
correlations between the variables. 
Here, we extend the time-series analysis to a comparison between countries, with a 
historical coverage spanning 148 years (1861–2008), and we also investigate the causal 
relationship between the two variables.8 We consider the two largest countries of 
Southern Europe, Italy and Spain − which are usually regarded as similar in culture and 
values, as well as with respect to some key institutional features and economic patterns9 
− and compare them with France, their principal neighbour, the country that both have 
often looked up to as providing proper terms of evaluation. These are big countries, 
                                                          
5 For Italy, see Fenoaltea (2003, 2005) and, more recently, Felice and Vecchi (2015a, 2015b). For Spain, see, 
among others, Pons and Tirado (2006), Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009), Prados de la Escosura 
(2010a), Sabaté, Fillat, and Gracia (2011) and Prados de la Escosura, Rosés, and Sanz-Villarroya (2012). For 
other countries, see, for instance, the remarkable study on Turkey by Altug, Filiztekin, and Pamuk (2008), or 
the recent reconstruction of Venezuelan GDP, 1830‒2012, by De Corso (2013). 
6 Unless of course Maddison’s (2010) renowned series are used. However, when it comes to a detailed 
scrutiny of national cases, Maddison’s estimates are not always trustworthy and, above all, comparisons not 
always reliable (Felice 2016). For a critique of Maddison’s Italian estimates, see Fenoaltea (2010, 2011). For 
time-series analysis using Maddison’s figures, see, for instance, Ben-David and Papell (2000). Time-series 
analyses with alternative estimates are usually limited to industrial output: Crafts, Leybourne, and Mills 
(1990); see also the Williamson project (Williamson 2011). 
7 For instance, Prados de la Escosura (2007) provides long-run comparisons of European countries by 
combining cross-sectional and time-series data. 
8 Our analysis stops at 2008 in order to avoid the relevant impact of the recent crisis. For an analysis of the 
2008 crisis impact on GDP across European countries, see e.g., Alessandrini and Fratianni (2015) or 
Tonveronachi (2015); for its social impact, see e.g., Botti et al. (2016). In this journal, Goldstein et al. (2013) 
elaborate on the impact of the crisis on fertility, a topic on which more research is certainly needed. 
9 At least in four important aspects: Both are Catholic countries, they share a Latin heritage (from neo-Latin 
languages to codified law), they are latecomers to European industrialization, and are medium- to large-sized 
countries with significant regional differences. 
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whose patterns can hardly be affected by geographically limited shocks, while arguably 
their inter-country heterogeneity is relatively low. Moreover, for these three countries it 
is now possible to keep at a minimum the heterogeneity coming from different 
estimates and procedures, at least to a reasonable degree, and this is what we strive to 
do in this paper.  
For our analysis, we benefit from recent advances in historical research, thanks to 
which it is now possible to compare relatively consistent series of GDP for Italy and 
Spain and to produce consistent long-run series of life expectancy. In the case of GDP, 
we make use of the new series at constant prices for Italy (Baffigi 2011; Felice and 
Vecchi 2015a),10 which is by many standards more reliable than the previous one 
included in Maddison (1991, 2010), and compare it with the one available for Spain 
produced by Prados de la Escosura (2003), which is incorporated into Maddison’s 
(2010) work.11 We obtain per capita series using the total population present in the 
country, rather than the resident population,12 since the former is the most appropriate 
when dealing with gross domestic product.13 In the case of life expectancy, we link the 
most updated estimates – for Italy in benchmark years (Felice and Vasta 2015) and for 
Spain in yearly series (Blanes Llorens 2007) – with previously available series on life 
expectancy or mortality, in order to produce long-run comparable series running from 
1861 to 2008.  
To sum up, we use updated series of life expectancy (either partly new yearly 
series, or new benchmarks which we interpolate with series of mortality or with 
previous series of life expectancy), in order to make the two countries more properly 
comparable, and refinements of the available GDP figures (limitedly to the use of the 
present population instead of the resident population). All these series are then 
compared with those available for France, which are taken from established databases 
(Maddison 2010; HMD, Human Mortality Database, 2011a). All series used were built 
following well-established procedures and are based on the most updated and reliable 
sources. However, it should be noted that the series for the second half of the 19th 
century are less reliable, as is frequently the case with this kind of data, and this is 
particularly true in our case for the estimates of life expectancy in Spain (Cabré, 
                                                          
10 Felice and Vecchi slightly updates Baffigi by incorporating the last stretch of the new Italian national 
accounts, i.e., the new estimates of industrial GDP running from 1938 to 1951 (from Felice and Carreras 
2012).  
11 Unlike others (Maluquer de Motes 2009a), the series by Prados de la Escosura look similar to the new 
Italian series in both method and level of accuracy. 
12 For Spain, we take population data from Maluquer de Motes (2008); for Italy, see the online statistical 
appendix. 
13 Gross domestic product (GDP) includes all income earned by the individuals and entities not officially 
living in a country. Gross national production (GNP) instead subtracts foreigners’ incomes from GDP, and 
includes the foreign income of the citizens of a country. To be consistent with their definitions, GDP should 
be divided by the present (de facto) population, and GNP by the resident (de jure) population.  
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Domingo, and Menacho 2002; Cabré 1999). For this reason they should be interpreted 
with caution. An extended online statistical appendix provides full details and an in-
depth discussion of the series we use and their underlying sources and methods, as well 
as additional econometric results. 
With the advantage of updated and often more reliable series, in what follows we 
consider the broad convergence patterns of Italy and Spain towards France in both GDP 
and life expectancy (Section 2), and compare the long-term movements of the two 
variables (Section 3). Through time-series analysis we then search for structural breaks 
and discuss the long-run contribution of life expectancy to GDP and of GDP to life 
expectancy (Section 4). We find evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between 
these two variables, and provide results or insights that, in our view, contribute in a 
number of ways to enriching extant literature.  
 
 
2. How close, how far? A comparison by pairs of indicators  
(1861–2008) 
The series of GDP per capita at constant prices – expressed in 1990 international 
purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars – of Italy, Spain, and France are displayed in 
Figure 1.14 The series are expressed in natural logarithms in the upper part and in inter-
country ratios in the lower part. To visually highlight the long-run trends in the series, 
the years around the wars (1914–1919 and 1936–1946), characterized by very high 
short-run variance, are not shown. These years are, however, considered in the 
following analyses.  
 
                                                          
14 In order to ensure full comparability, all series consider the three countries as defined by their present 
geographical borders. 
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Figure 1: Per capita GDP in France, Italy, and Spain, 1861‒2008 
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The history of the ‘race’ in GDP between Italy and Spain can be summarized as 
follows. Italy began at a higher level, but lost some ground in the first decade after 
unification, and then from the end of the 19th century until the Spanish Civil War it had 
a slight edge, although experiencing ups and downs. For fifteen years (1946–1961) after 
the Second World War the Italian advantage over Spain increased dramatically, but 
from the early 1960s Spain and Italy began to converge. Further insight comes from a 
comparison with France, as shown in the bottom part of Figure 1. Until the second half 
of the 20th century both Italy and Spain were declining, relative to France. Italy fell 
behind until 1899, thereafter remaining more or less stable, whereas Spain continued to 
lose ground until 1960. However, in the second half of the 20th century the two 
countries began steadily to converge, first Italy, then Spain. By the mid-1990s Italy had 
almost drawn equal with France, but from 2001 onwards it fell behind again, while 
conversely Spain continued to converge until 2008.15  
To sum up, until the Second World War, Italy was confined to the status of the 
European periphery and was much closer to Spain than to France. In the second half of 
the 20th century its status became that of the European core; however, this status is now 
in doubt (Felice and Vecchi 2015a). Spain began to converge towards the European 
core later, but its catching-up only came to a halt with the economic crisis. 
It is interesting to compare GDP with life expectancy. The new series of this 
variable for Italy and Spain and that already available for France are shown in Figure 2 
(the years around the wars, 1914–1919 and 1936−1946, are not shown). In contrast to 
GDP, at the beginning, i.e., through the first decades after Italy’s unification until the 
end of the 19th century, in life expectancy Italy’s advantage over Spain increased. 
                                                          
15 This result is significantly different from that found by Molinas and Prados de la Escosura using previous 
series for Italy and Spain and benchmark comparisons between the two. According to them, Spain and Italy 
attained similar levels of per capita income at around the same historical date, but Spain converged later than 
Italy in structural change (Molinas and Prados de la Escosura 1989). It is probable that the discrepancy is only 
apparent: Spain also began to modernize later than Italy in per capita GDP. However, it is worth adding that 
this story would be significantly different had we used a different purchasing power parity index, closer in 
time to us: so different that such a PPP index would appear unreliable. When computing GDP series at 2008 
PPPs (Table A-2 in the online statistical appendix) Spain appears to be significantly closer to Italy. Indeed, at 
2008 PPPs it would be above Italy through most of the 1872−1935 period. Spain would also be historically 
much closer to France, by less than 5% in the second half of the 1870s. Italy also would rank closer to France, 
and it would even overtake it from 1986 to 2004. We find these results unrealistic, since they contrast with 
what we know about the economic histories of these countries: throughout this period Spain was most 
probably poorer than Italy and undoubtedly much poorer than France. Our conclusion from this exercise is 
that 2008 PPPs should not be used for historical comparison between these countries, probably because they 
reflect remarkably different trends in their respective national consumer price indexes in the first few years 
after the introduction of the euro. However, for the very last few years, more recent PPPs are undoubtedly 
more reliable and reinforce the convergence trend of Spain towards both Italy and France. This last trend is, 
therefore, stronger than it appears from our 1990 PPP benchmark. We also tested the 2005 and 2011 PPP 
benchmarks, and the results are not significantly different from those for the 2008 one. For further details on 
the use of different PPP benchmarks, see the online statistical appendix. 
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However, a second and maybe more important difference from the previous results is 
that Spain began to converge at the beginning of the 20th century and its life expectancy 
caught up with Italy’s in the 1960s;16 i.e., much earlier than its convergence in GDP. 
This result differs from what previous life expectancy data for Spain has suggested, that 
Spain began converging fifteen years earlier, around the second half of the 1880s, and 
stopped some years earlier, in the decade following the Second World War. This 
discrepancy is due to the fact that the official censuses, and even HMD data until 1930, 
under-reported infant mortality (for further details, see the online statistical appendix). 
Lastly, it should be noted that in the second half of the 1990s there was a new ‘reversal 
of fortunes’ in terms of life expectancy, with Italy once again taking the lead.  
In broad terms, there are two important similarities between the patterns of GDP 
per capita and those of life expectancy: the initial advantage of Italy and the 
convergence of Spain over the long run. However, it is equally clear that the two 
indicators differ in at least two important respects. First, Spain began to converge 
sooner in life expectancy, and even overtook Italy as early as the 1960s when its 
convergence in per capita GDP had only just begun; second, Italy in turn again 
overtook Spain in life expectancy in the late 1990s, that is, at the same time as the 
Spanish convergence in per capita GDP accelerated remarkably.  
 
                                                          
16 The remarkable growth of life expectancy in Spain during most of the 20th century is confirmed by other 
studies: see Spijker, Cámara, and Blanes (2012, p. 282) for 20-year growth rates by gender in the 1911‒1991 
period. 
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Figure 2: Life expectancy in France, Italy, and Spain, 1861‒2008 
 
 
 
Sources: Table A-4; data for France are from HMD (2011a). 
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When comparing Italy and Spain’s life expectancy with that of France, it emerges 
that around 1861 France had an even greater lead over Italy in life expectancy than it 
did in GDP. Italy, however, began to converge soon, starting in 1863, and had caught 
up with France by the mid-1950s, soon after convergence in GDP had begun and well 
before it was completed. This is similar to what we have seen for Spain in comparison 
with Italy. During the last decades, Italy continued to improve its position in life 
expectancy with respect to France, and had surpassed France by 1999. Conversely, 
Spain endured more ups and downs and began to steadily converge towards France later 
than Italy, in the last years of the 19th century, and reached the same level as France 
roughly a decade after Italy did, in the middle of the 1960s. At the beginning of the 
1970s, Spain also overtook France, and managed to maintain its lead throughout the 
1980s. During the last two decades, Spain and France have ranked at practically the 
same level, although Spain has been falling slightly behind − once again, in sharp 
contrast with the GDP series. It may be worth adding that the convergence of Spain also 
took place in a wide range of other indicators of wellbeing, from height,17 to per capita 
calories,18 to composite indicators such as the Human Development Index. With respect 
to education, Spain has overtaken Italy in the last few years.19  
From these comparisons, two regularities or common features emerge in the 
patterns of GDP and life expectancy. The first is the starting point. Differences in GDP 
mirror those in life expectancy at lower levels of socioeconomic development. At early 
stages a clear lead in GDP results in a clear lead in life expectancy, and vice versa. This 
finding is not new: in past historical periods when material conditions were dire and 
significant breakthroughs in medicine and social conditions had not yet taken place, 
there was a strong correlation between life expectancy and income in poor countries 
(e.g., Fogel 2004).20 The second regularity concerns the trend: in both Italy and Spain, 
convergence in life expectancy begins earlier than in GDP. Life expectancy converges 
when the leading country (France in the case of Italy, and Italy in the case of Spain) is 
in the upward curve of its industrial transformation (which in its early stages may well 
have negative consequences for life expectancy). At the same time, the follower 
benefits from declining mortality due to breakthroughs in medicine and social 
conditions, but has not yet embarked on industrial transformation. This finding is in line 
                                                          
17 For Italy, see A’Hearn, Peracchi, and Vecchi (2009: 12−13); for Spain, see María-Dolores and Martínez-
Carrión (2011: 35) and Martínez-Carrión and Puche-Gil (2011: 444 and 447). 
18 For Italy, see Sorrentino and Vecchi (2011: 12); for Spain, see Cussó Segura (2005). 
19 For Italy, see Felice and Vasta (2015); for Spain, see Prados de la Escosura (2010b). 
20 It is worth noting that such a correlation holds for modern times as well, as shown most noticeably by the 
well-known Preston (1975) curve, but is now probably less strong, allowing for important exceptions such as 
the ‘Jamaica paradox’, i.e., countries with low GDP and high life expectancy (Riley 2005). Furthermore, as 
we are going to see, this correlation is no longer valid once we transform the longevity function in order to 
properly account for improvements among the elderly. The analysis by Pérez Moreda, Reher, and Sanz 
Gimeno (2015: 296–299) also confirms the existence of the Preston curve in 20th century Spain. 
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with literature showing that − in modern times − it is possible to reach high levels of 
life expectancy even at relatively low levels of GDP (Caldwell 1986; Riley 2005).21  
Of course, life expectancy is a highly synthetic indicator, whose evolution can be 
better understood by looking at its specific components. A primary issue is sex 
difference, where the three countries show remarkable similarities. They all record 
higher longevity for women, and with a similar advantage over men, growing from 
about one year at the beginning of the period to around six years at the end (HMD 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Cabré, Domingo, and Menacho 2002; Blanes Llorens 2007). By 
contrast, age differences in mortality confirm the major backwardness of Italy and 
above all of Spain with respect to France, especially concerning mortality between the 
first and the third years of life (Ramiro Fariñas and Sanz Gimeno 2000a). As is well 
known, until the 20th century much of the increase in life expectancy at birth nearly 
everywhere was a consequence of falling infant and child mortality rates. In absolute 
terms, this is true also for Italy and Spain. In addition, there are some broad features 
common to all continental Europe, despite the differences in level. Around the 1870s 
childhood mortality began to decline. In the interwar years, thanks to public health 
measures and the construction of urban infrastructure, the ratio of urban/rural mortality 
also started to fall. Then, after the Second World War, the spread of modern medicine 
and the advent of antibiotics further contributed to this process (e.g., Cutler, Deaton, 
and Lleras-Muney 2006; Livi-Bacci 2012).22 However, in terms of convergence, Spain, 
and to a lesser degree Italy, began to catch up later. In terms of infant mortality, Spain 
started to converge only after 1960 (Nicolau 1989: 57 and 70–72). In Italy, convergence 
in infant mortality had begun in the second half of the 19th century and accelerated in 
the second half of the 20th century (Felice 2007: 115). These different paces seem to be 
at least partly related to the relative economic backwardness of the two countries. In 
Spain, for instance, the agrarian regions were, in demographic terms, more important 
than in Italy.23 Apart from lower average incomes, agrarian regions endured lower 
hygienic and nutritional standards than the industrial areas, with consequences for 
                                                          
21 Not only for the reasons sketched above, but also thanks to other advances in social conditions such as 
improvements in literacy and education, especially among women (Riley 2001: 200−219). Literacy and 
education are omitted variables in our study, worthy of more investigation in the future (as far as we can tell 
at the present stage, their inclusion will further corroborate our findings). 
22 For a recent and highly detailed analysis of these dynamics for the Spanish case, see Pérez Moreda, Reher, 
and Sanz Gimeno (2015: 79–248). 
23 In Spain the population of Catalonia, Madrid, and the Basque Country, the three most industrialized 
regions, went from 16% of the total in 1857 to 22% in 1950. At the same time, in Italy the population in the 
regions of the industrial triangle − Piedmont, Liguria, and Lombardy − was always above 25% (and if we 
include the region of Rome, the strength of which was services rather than industry, the population was 
around 30%–32%). For Spain, see the estimates by Rosés, Martínez-Galarraga, and Tirado (2010) and the 
population figures by Nicolau (2005); for Italy, see the estimates by Felice (2010, 2011) and the population 
figures by Felice (2007: 16).  
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mortality levels.24 A similar case can be made for the convergence of Southern Italy, 
whose mortality trends, when compared to the Centre-North of the peninsula (Felice 
and Vasta 2015), display features similar to those of Spain.  
But the timing of the decline in infant mortality is also linked to a broader issue, a 
crucial one in the theoretical literature on the relation between life expectancy and 
GDP: the first demographic transition. France was the first country to undergo a 
demographic transition. There, the demographic transition began in the 19th century and 
was completed in the first half of the 20th. In Italy, it lasted approximately from 1876 to 
1965, as it did in other European countries such as Germany (Chesnay 1986: 294 and 
301; Livi-Bacci 2012: 118). Conversely, in Spain the demographic transition was 
completed only during the 1980s (Carreras and Tafunell 2004: 38). A slower 
demographic transition means higher fertility rates and thus higher infant mortality. It 
may also have an impact on the relationship between life expectancy and GDP, as 
argued by the unified growth literature.  
 
 
3. Trends in GDP and life expectancy 
Thus far, we have considered GDP and life expectancy separately. However, in order to 
properly relate GDP and life expectancy, some transformations of the original values 
are required.  
Life expectancy is a bounded variable: It has asymptotic limits that result from 
biological features (which may only be modified, and probably only to a certain extent, 
much more slowly than the time frame considered here). As a consequence, when its 
original values are employed, as life expectancy increases identical absolute changes 
result in lower increases. Specifically, when its starting level is lower, life expectancy 
mainly rises because of reductions in infant mortality; when its level is higher, it mainly 
falls among the elderly, but this has a minor impact on its rate of change. In short, the 
use of the original values implicitly assigns a higher weight to mortality reductions 
early in life (Deaton 2006); that is to say, it gives “more weight to saving the life of the 
younger over older people” (Prados de la Escosura 2014, p. 4). A solution was proposed 
by Kakwani (1993) and was adopted by Prados de la Escosura (2014), among others, 
via an achievement function that ensures that – so to speak – returns to increases in life 
expectancy do not decrease at higher levels. Accordingly, we compute Kakwani-
transformed life expectancy (LEk) following the formula:  
                                                          
24 This is supported by what we know about the slow modernization of Spain in the production and 
consumption of some key foods, like milk (Hernández Adell, Muñoz Pradas, and Pujol Andreu 2013). In 
terms of convergence this had a higher impact, especially after the urban/rural ratio in infant mortality started 
to fall. 
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𝐿𝐸𝑘 = [𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀−𝑀0)−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀−𝑥)]
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀−𝑀0)   (1) 
 
where M is a maximum goalpost (83.2), M0 is a minimum goalpost (20), x is the value 
of life expectancy, and log stands for the natural logarithm.25 
By contrast, the GDP is an explosive rather than a bounded variable (at least in the 
period considered here). Thus, for time series analyses it is usually convenient to adopt 
a log transformation on its original values (Sen and Anand 2000), as we did in Figure 
1.26 In the economic literature a common justification for this practice is that in the case 
of GDP, as opposed to life expectancy, returns to well-being, or to the quality of life, 
are most likely to decline as the variable grows (Palazzi and Lauri 1998; Casadio 
Tarabusi, and Palazzi 2004; and, for the case of Italy, Sylos Labini 2014).  
Figure 3 compares income and life expectancy for Italy, Spain, and France, 
making use of a natural log transformation for income and of a Kakwani transformation 
for life expectancy. Transformed GDP grew more than transformed life expectancy 
over the 1861‒2008 period, even though our transformation increases the growth rate of 
life expectancy and decreases that of GDP. However, life expectancy accelerated its 
growth in the last decades, when, conversely, GDP began slowing down. Unlike the 
previous result, this would not have emerged had we kept the original figures for 
income and life expectancy.  
Beside these two common broad trends, there are significant cyclical differences 
between the three countries, which appear to be somehow related to their different 
levels of socioeconomic development. In Italy, GDP grew more than life expectancy 
from the end of the 19th century until the 1970s; later on, it was life expectancy (or, 
better, achievements in longevity) that grew faster. For France we observe the same 
relationship, but significantly reinforced. In Spain, which was more backward, GDP 
grew more than life expectancy from the second half of the 19th century until the Civil 
War. Then, in the first two decades of Franco’s regime, life expectancy grew at a faster 
rate than income. From the 1960s, GDP again grew faster than life expectancy, and this 
has only begun to change in the last few decades. 
  
                                                          
25 For the Kakwani transformation, we thus use the same thresholds as in Prados de la Escosura (2014, 2013), 
which are in turn obtained from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2010). In the UNDP 
reports from 1995 to 2009 the maximum and minimum values for life expectancy at birth were respectively 
established at 85 and 25 years. In the UNDP (2011) the maximum has been updated to 83.4 years (the new 
highest observed value). We tested the use of 85 years as a maximum and, as expected, results do not change 
significantly (they are available from the authors upon request). 
26 For a test of different transformations of GDP and different assumptions of returns to scale, which support 
the use of a natural log function, see Cahill (2002). 
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Figure 3: Income and life expectancy in Italy, Spain, and France, 1861‒2008 
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4. Time series analysis 
4.1 Granger causality 
In order to formally analyse the correlation between life expectancy and GDP, it is first 
necessary to investigate their order of integration. As shown in Table A-5 in the online 
statistical appendix, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests show that it is necessary to produce 
first-differences of all series in order to make them stationary, i.e., all series exhibit a 
unit root. As a consequence, descriptive statistics of the simple correlation between 
GDP and life expectancy (as shown in the correlograms in Figure 4)27 necessarily 
highlight a strong comovement of the series, with marked cross-correlation in all 
countries even extending over a 20-year interval.  
However, such correlation does not imply that the series are indeed related, since 
integration of the first order implies that all series grow in time, possibly within an 
overall process of socioeconomic development. By contrast, consideration of the first 
differences of the series produces much less obvious results (as shown in Figure 4c). 
Thus, in the rest of the analysis, both series will always be considered in their first 
differences (denoted by ∆). 
In order to investigate the relation between GDP and life expectancy we make 
recourse to the concept of Granger-causality, well known to economists. As shown 
below, Granger causality tests allow us to check for systematic short-run correlations 
between life expectancy and GDP. However, it should preliminarily be noted that the 
two series may well exhibit longer-term relations, for instance, via health investments 
made much earlier in life. A time-series analysis can hardly capture this effect: To this 
end a cross-sectional analysis based on a larger sample of countries (even though 
necessarily with less measurement accuracy than is possible here) would probably be 
more informative. Thus, our approach should be regarded as complementary to the 
more diffused approaches reviewed in Section 1, rather than as an alternative.  
 
  
                                                          
27 Given two series xi and yi, with i = 1, 2, … N-1, the cross-correlation r at delay d is defined as:  
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where x  and y are the means of the corresponding series. The cross-correlogram in Figure 4 shows the 
resulting values for d up to 20. For an introduction to this method, see Chatfield (1980: 169–174). 
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Figure 4: Cross-correlations of GDP and life expectancy 
Figure 4a) – GDP and modified LE 
 
   
 
Figure 4b) – GDP and ln (LE) 
 
   
 
Figure 4c) – GDP and modified LE: first differences 
 
   
 
 
Intuitively, a variable x is said to Granger-cause another variable, y, if x 
systematically anticipates y in time. That is to say, x is considered to be the cause of y if 
the values of y can be better predicted by using past values of x (and possibly y too) 
than by using past values of y alone.28 It is customary to test for the presence of Granger 
                                                          
28 Granger-causality only implies a systematic temporal relation between two variables (i.e., x contains useful 
information to foresee changes in y: Granger 1969). This does not necessarily entail a cause-effect relation. 
For example, whenever y depends on deliberate human action, it may be the case that people systematically 
anticipate their decision(s) on the basis of their expectations regarding the future (i.e., the future values of x). 
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causality by regressing y on lagged values of y and x (Stock and Watson 2007). Wald 
statistics are then obtained, under the hypothesis that all coefficients on the lags of 
variable x are jointly zero in the equation for variable y. 
However, since we are interested in both directions of causality, we run a vector 
regression (VR), allowing for up to four time lags (denoted here by j) for both variables. 
As already mentioned, we consider both LE and GDP (denoted by Y) in first 
differences, in order to investigate stationary series:  
 
�
∆𝐿𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ∙ ∆𝐿𝐸𝑡−𝑗4𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 ∙ ∆𝑌𝑡−𝑗4𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛿 + ∑ 𝜗𝑗 ∙ ∆𝐿𝐸𝑡−𝑗4𝑗 + ∑ 𝜑𝑗 ∙ ∆𝑌𝑡−𝑗4𝑗 + 𝑢𝑡  (2) 
 
where the use of vector regression allows for the possible correlation between εt and ut. 
We separately test the two null hypotheses that all the coefficients that express the 
impact of one variable on the other (the four γjs and the four φjs) are not significantly 
different from zero, i.e., there is no Granger causality. The alternative hypothesis is that 
at least one coefficient is statistically different from zero (thus Granger causality cannot 
be excluded at the conventional thresholds of confidence). Accordingly, the test 
statistics is a Wald χ2 with 4 degrees of freedom. Results are shown in the two left-hand 
columns of Table 1. 
Overall, Granger causality tests of the relation between GDP growth and life 
expectancy are inconclusive. In most cases it emerges that no series has a statistically 
significant impact on the other at any time lag (up to four). The exceptions are Italy 
when using the natural logarithm of life expectancy rather than our modified index (this 
is done as a robustness check: see above, Section 3), and Spain, in the direction from 
GDP to life expectancy.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                             
If that were the case, realisations of the dependent variable y could actually be observed before the appearance 
of its real cause, x. Economic textbooks joke that people may send Christmas Greetings cards days before 
Christmas, even though the latter causes the former. Thus, in general the interpretation of Granger-causality 
as an actual relation of cause and effect between two variables requires reference to an underlying theoretical 
model (in our case, the unified growth theory). However, here we consider aggregate variables that do not 
depend on a single individual’s decision(s), and thus here the concept of Granger-causality may be regarded 
as empirically meaningful, even though more research (and theoretical models) on the causal link(s) between 
GDP growth and life expectancy are necessary. 
Felice, Pujol Andreu & D’Ippoliti: GDP and life expectancy in Italy and Spain over the long run 
830 http://www.demographic-research.org 
Table 1: Tests for Granger causality  
  VAR estimation Acemoglu-Johnson 
  Wald χ2(4) p-value IV coeff. Std. Err. 
Italy GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 2.4412 0.655 0.032 0.034 
  Modified LE Granger-causes GDP 14.45 0.006 0.571 0.267 
Spain GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 11.89 0.018 0.045 0.026 
  Modified LE Granger-causes GDP 2.0774 0.722 0.013 0.331 
France GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 4.2224 0.377 0.047 0.036 
  Modified LE Granger-causes GDP 5.6425 0.227 -0.084 0.304 
 
Note: bold values denote statistically significant coefficients, i.e., Granger causality cannot be refuted. For the second-step 
regressions in Acemoglu-Johnson estimates, see Table A-6 in the online statistical appendix. 
 
Traditionally, economists think that such mixed results may arise due to possible 
endogeneity of the independent variables. Even though there is hardly reason to believe 
that GDP changes may be a consequence of LE developments – which they nonetheless 
anticipate in time – or vice versa, this has been claimed (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson 
2007). They thus propose coping with this possible endogeneity using an instrumental 
variables approach (IV), adopting as instruments the second differences of LE and 
GDP, the third differences, and so on (respectively denoted by ∆2 and ∆3, etc.).  
Thus, as a robustness check we run such models, but due to computational and 
data limitations we limit the analysis to causality with one time lag, as shown below 
(variables with a hat denote predicted values): 
 
 �
∆𝐿𝐸𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 ∙ ∆𝐿𝐸𝑡−𝑗4𝑗 + 𝜁 ∙ ∆𝑌𝑡−1� + 𝜀𝑡
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝜂 + 𝜆 ∙ ∆𝐿𝐸𝑡−1� + ∑ 𝜑𝑗 ∙ ∆𝑌𝑡−𝑗4𝑗 + 𝑢𝑡  (3) 
 
Thus the first stage regressions are: 
 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧∆𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 = 𝑎 +�𝜓𝑗 ∙ ∆𝑌𝑡−𝑗4
𝑗
+ 𝑏 ∙ ∆2𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝑐 ∙ ∆3𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝑑 ∙ ∆4𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝑒 ∙ ∆5𝐿𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
∆𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝑓 +�𝜏𝑗 ∙ ∆𝐿𝐸𝑡−𝑗4
𝑗
+ 𝑔 ∙ ∆2𝑌𝑡−1 + ℎ ∙ ∆3𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑘 ∙ ∆4𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑙 ∙ ∆5𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 (4) 
 
Accordingly, the two right hand columns in Table 1 report the coefficients and 
standard errors of the instrumented variable in the second-step regressions of the IV 
estimates (the terms ζ and λ in [3]). As shown, the results also remain mixed in this 
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case (full results are reported in Table A-6 in the online statistical annex). Indeed, the 
IV procedure returns similar results to the VR estimation in terms of the statistical 
significance of the coefficients of interest (i.e., we cannot reject Granger causality only 
of LE on GDP for Italy, and of GDP on LE for Spain). Thus, in both models (VR and 
IV estimations) the lack of consistent results prevents us from identifying a stable and 
consistent causality relation between life expectancy and GDP, which is problematic 
from the point of view of the unified growth theory.  
One possible explanation for this lack of consistency is that the relation between 
the two variables is non-monotonic but rather changes over time. In order to investigate 
this possibility, we investigate the series for possible structural breaks, i.e., points 
beyond which it may be said that a series exhibits a significantly different pattern (e.g., 
a different long-run trend) and which therefore define periods that – at least for some 
empirical applications – should be considered separately. 
 
 
4.2 Structural breaks and sub-period Granger causality 
In order to detect whether there are any breaks in the series, in this section we adopt an 
ex-post periodization. We use the well-known test developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003). As shown in Table A-7 in the online statistical appendix, frequently, though not 
consistently, the identification of several breaks fits the data better in terms of the sum 
of squared residuals. In the extreme, treating each year as unique would produce the 
best historical explanation. However, reasons of parsimony in choosing the explicative 
model induce us to weigh the information that additional variables provide against the 
complexity that they introduce into our model.  
To this end, a common approach is to select the number of breaks that maximizes 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Excluding the cases of four or more breaks, 
for all series the local maximum of the BIC corresponds to zero structural breaks. This 
does not imply that the series necessarily exhibit no structural breaks, but rather that, 
taken in isolation, the information that can be obtained from considering these breaks 
would not compensate for the complexity that they introduce into the model. However, 
since the aim of this section is to prudentially investigate whether structural breaks may 
induce the mixed results concerning Granger causality that we discussed above, for all 
series we consider at least one break.29 This can therefore be considered as a robustness 
check of the previous analysis.  
                                                          
29 An anonymous referee noted that from a historical point of view it can be objected that such breaks are 
hardly ‘turning points’, in the sense that no distinctly different behaviour of the variable emerges (e.g., a 
switch from stagnation to growth). For example, in relation to mortality, World War II merely “accelerated 
the process of decline already going on from 1870s”. This is more or less what the BIC tests tell us. However, 
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As shown in Figure 5, according to the Bai-Perron tests the breaks that best 
describe the series (peak values of the F statistics) are: 1946 for both modified LE and 
GDP in France, respectively 1944 and 1947 for Italy, and respectively 1941 and 1937 
for Spain. As shown in Table A-8 in the online statistical appendix, further tests for 
exogenous breaks, following Prados de la Escosura (2003), confirm the same breaks for 
the three countries. 
Thus, we identify structural breaks in both life expectancy and GDP roughly 
corresponding to the Second World War for Italy and France and to the Civil War for 
Spain. For Italy, as is well known, the end of the Second World War marked the 
beginning of a period of unprecedented growth – the “economic miracle” − which 
brought the country back “from the periphery to the centre” (Zamagni 1993) as the sixth 
world economic power, and which saw remarkable improvements in social indicators 
and well-being (Felice and Vecchi 2015b). The misalignment of breaks in the Spanish 
series may arise from the peculiarity of the country’s socioeconomic development, and 
may be interpreted as a manifestation of its underdevelopment in the early and mid-20th 
century, until well into the 1960s.30 
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
here we are interested in prudentially investigating – as a robustness check of the previous analysis – whether 
such acceleration(s), beyond a certain threshold, should be regarded as defining two periods that should be 
kept separate in empirical applications, and specifically whether they could induce us to falsely reject 
causality between LE and GDP. 
30 For Spain, this finding is partly in accordance with the results of Pons and Tirado (2006), who, through a 
variant of Andrews’s (1993) methodology, also found no breaks in the Spanish (Prados’s) GDP series before 
the Civil War, though they also find a break as late as 1960. A break around 1960 (in 1959) also appears in 
our Bai-Perron tests, but only from the model with three breaks onwards and along with another break in 
1915 (see Table A-7 in the online statistical appendix). There is a vast literature stressing the missed 
opportunities of the Spanish economy from the last decades of the 19th century until Franco’s 1959 
stabilization and liberalization plan: Essentially, there was a continuity, characterized by sluggish economic 
growth and international isolation, from the Bourbon Restoration (1874–1923) to the dictatorship of Primo De 
Rivera and the short-lived Second Republic (1923–1939), to the first phase of Franchism (1939–1959) 
(Carreras 1990, 1997; Fraile 1991; Nadal and Sudrià 1993; Velarde 1999). Here it is worth stressing that a 
model with a 1959 break would not fit well in this literature, not so much concerning the first phase of 
Franchism, negative as it was (Carreras 1989; Comín 1995; Prados de la Escosura 1997), but rather due to the 
early break in 1915.  
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Figure 5: Bai-Perron tests for structural breaks in GDP and LE series 
Figure 5a: GDP Spain 
 
Note: estimated breakpoint at 1937 
Figure 5b: Modified LE Spain
 
Note: estimated breakpoint at 1941 
 
Figure 5c: GDP Italy
 
Note: estimated breakpoint at 1947 
 
Figure 5d: Modified LE Italy
 
Note: estimated breakpoint at 1944 
 
Figure 5e: GDP France
 
Note: estimated breakpoint at 1946 
 
Figure 5f: Modified LE France
 
Note: estimated breakpoint at 1946 
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Repeating the tests of Granger causality for the sub-periods identified by these 
breaks, as shown in Table 2, helps us clarifying a number of crucial issues. In the first 
period, which can be identified with economic backwardness, economic growth 
consistently Granger-causes improvements in life expectancy in Spain and Italy, but not 
in France, the country with the highest levels of GDP and LE and the lowest LE 
growth. The reverse, i.e., that improvements in life expectancy Granger-cause GDP 
growth, seems to be true in Italy and in France for this period, but not in Spain, i.e., in 
the country with the lowest level of GDP and LE. In the second period, i.e., after the 
Second World War for Italy and France and after the Civil War for Spain, the 
bidirectional Granger-causality is confirmed for Italy and partially for Spain (although 
for Spain such a result crucially depends on the specific periodization used – i.e., if the 
1941 break is included or not in this second period – and therefore the result cannot be 
considered as very robust). By contrast, for France we observe an inversion of statistical 
significance, with GDP growth now predicting LE improvements, while improvements 
in LE no longer predict GDP growth. 
 
Table 2: Tests for Granger causality in the sub-periods 
   Wald χ2(4) p-value 
Italy: first GDP period (1861‒1947) GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 9.4584 0.051 
  Mod. LE Granger-causes GDP 13.627 0.009 
Italy: second GDP period (1947‒2008) GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 8.0416 0.09 
  Mod. LE Granger-causes GDP 11.725 0.02 
Italy: first LE period (1861‒1944) GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 8.168 0.086 
  Mod. LE Granger-causes GDP 16.842 0.002 
Italy: second LE period (1944‒2008) GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 18.45 0.001 
  Mod. LE Granger-causes GDP 10.32 0.035 
Spain: first GDP period (1861‒1937) GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 8.2949 0.081 
  Mod. LE Granger-causes GDP 5.2346 0.264 
Spain: second GDP period (1937‒2008) GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 8.3729 0.079 
  Mod. LE Granger-causes GDP 10.58 0.032 
Spain: first LE period (1861‒1941) GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 8.2773 0.082 
  Mod. LE Granger-causes GDP 5.1629 0.271 
Spain: second LE period (1941‒2008) GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 1.0321 0.905 
  Mod. LE Granger-causes GDP 12.06 0.017 
France: first GDP/LE period (1861‒1946) GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 2.0717 0.723 
  Mod. LE Granger-causes GDP 15.886 0.003 
France: second GDP/LE period (1946‒2008) GDP Granger-causes Modified LE 18.627 0.001 
  Mod. LE Granger-causes GDP 4.7677 0.312 
 
Note: bold values denote statistically significant coefficients, i.e., Granger causality cannot be refuted. 
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We may sum up the results as follows. Improvements in life expectancy seem to 
predict GDP growth, but with two exceptions: Spain in the first period, i.e., the country 
with lower levels of GDP and life expectancy and a delayed demographic transition; 
and France in the second period, i.e., the country with higher GDP and life expectancy 
(and slower growth). Economic growth consistently Granger-causes improvements in 
modified life expectancy, with one important exception: France in the first period, i.e., 
the country with the earliest demographic transition, where improvements in life 
expectancy appear to be slower and independent of economic growth. 
By combining these results with the analysis in the previous Section (see Figure 3), 
some important points arise regarding the correlation between GDP and life expectancy. 
One issue is the causality going from life expectancy to income, concerning which we 
can detect three phases. In the first, there does not seem to be a significant contribution 
of life expectancy to income: The initial rise in income is independent of improvements 
in life expectancy. In the second phase, improvements in life expectancy do seem to 
lead to further advances in GDP. The movements in these first two phases are 
compatible with the unified growth theory, which stresses a positive impact of 
improvements in life expectancy upon economic growth only after the onset of the 
demographic transition (Galor and Weil 2000; Cervellati and Sunde 2011). In a third 
phase, when a negative link (or at least a non-positive one) from life expectancy to GDP 
seems to emerge: Very high life expectancy may result in a disproportionately old 
population, which may hamper economic growth. Such an outcome, in line with what 
has been found for other countries such as the United States (Eggleston and Fuchs 
2012), was not predicted by the unified growth theory. 
Concerning the impact of income on life expectancy, it is commonly held that at 
the early stages GDP significantly impacts upon life expectancy. By analysing the 
historical data for 16 Western countries in benchmark years from 1870 to 2000, Livi-
Bacci (2012, p. 125) has simplified the rationale as follows: “more food, better clothing, 
better houses, and more medical care have a notable effect on those who are 
malnourished, badly clothed, poorly housed, and forced to trust fate in case of 
sickness”. Regarding later phases, it has been argued that when a rise in per capita GDP 
benefits an already prosperous population the effects on life expectancy are minimal, 
and may even be negative if GDP growth comes at the detriment of environmental 
conditions.31 Once a Kakwani transformation is employed in order to properly account 
for achievements in longevity − that is, once we eliminate the bias in favour of infant 
mortality and treat more fairly the improvements in longevity of the elderly 
                                                          
31 It may even result in an increase of obesity (Egger, Swinburn, and Islam 2012). This latter, however, is also 
strongly influenced by other factors, such as GDP inequality (Costa-Font, Hernández-Quevedo, and Jiménez-
Rubio 2014) and education. For an empirical investigation of the role of education in determining the regional 
differences in overweight rates observed in the Italian regions (with higher overweight rates in the South, 
despite lower GDP per capita), see Brunello and Labartino (2014). 
Felice, Pujol Andreu & D’Ippoliti: GDP and life expectancy in Italy and Spain over the long run 
836 http://www.demographic-research.org 
population – only the first of these assumptions is supported by our findings, and even 
with the important exception of France (possibly because it already enjoyed a relatively 
high life expectancy which tended to grow less, as a consequence of an early 
demographic transition). A positive impact of GDP on life expectancy is also found for 
the following period, when GDP significantly increased.  
On the whole, these results show that the heterogeneity in the relation between life 
expectancy and GDP growth that was found for the entire series may indeed depend on 
the existence of structural breaks. However, the specific historical experience of each 
country is important too: Within a general framework, country-specific historical 
idiosyncrasies should not be overlooked.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
After reviewing and updating the available estimates, we presented and discussed long-
run (1861–2008) series of per capita GDP and life expectancy for Italy and Spain and 
compared them with those available for France, their common and most important 
neighbouring country. Our goal was not only to briefly reconsider the economic history 
of the two countries in the light of the new time series evidence, but also to investigate 
the long-run evolution of per capita GDP and life expectancy and their mutual 
relationship, by way of country case studies and a time-series approach.  
We find evidence, or confirmation, of three common features in the patterns of per 
capita GDP and life expectancy. First, at early stages of socioeconomic development, 
when both GDP and life expectancy are low, the differences in GDP mirror those in life 
expectancy: A clear lead in GDP results in a clear lead in life expectancy. Second, in 
the long run, convergence is confirmed for both indicators (significant cyclical 
differences notwithstanding): At the beginning of the period, Spain is the most 
backward country in both life expectancy and GDP, but over the entire period it is also 
the country converging at the highest average rate, while Italy ranks in the middle 
between Spain and France. Third, convergence in life expectancy tends to begin earlier 
than convergence in GDP: Spain caught up with Italy earlier in life expectancy than in 
GDP, and both countries caught up with France earlier in life expectancy than in GDP. 
When looking at the correlation between the two variables through time series 
analysis, after dividing the series into two sub-periods we find that improvements in life 
expectancy may be said to cause GDP growth, with two exceptions: Spain in the first 
period and France in the second period. We find that economic growth causes 
improvements in life expectancy (in a Granger-causality sense) in all cases except for 
France in the first period.  
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Concerning the causal link from life expectancy to income, our findings may be 
explained by the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between the two variables. 
In line with recent results from unified growth theory, before the onset of the 
demographic transition it seems that there is no significant impact of life expectancy on 
income, whereas after the demographic transition improvements in life expectancy lead 
to further advances in GDP. More recently, however, a third phase appears to emerge, 
characterized by a negative link from (very high) life expectancy to GDP. Such a 
finding cannot be explained in terms of the unified growth theory and deserves further 
study.  
Finally, concerning the link from income to life expectancy, once the latter is 
transformed in order to properly account for achievements in longevity, we find 
evidence of a positive and consistent impact of GDP on life expectancy. However, an 
exception must be made for France, which experienced an early demographic transition.  
In conclusion, our findings confirm the importance of a general theoretical 
framework in order to address the correlation between life expectancy and GDP, such 
as that proposed by the unified growth theory. However, they also suggest that the 
peculiarity of each historical case should not be ignored.  
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Appendices 
Online statistical appendix  
Part I: A discussion of data and sources 
A-1 Gross domestic product (GDP) 
The statistical apparatus behind GDP was developed in the USA in the 1930s, and was 
progressively adopted by other countries only after the Second World War, beginning 
with Great Britain and Western Europe. This is why GDP figures for periods before the 
Second World War are always the product of reconstruction by economic historians or 
applied statisticians. The Italian Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, Istat, was one of the 
first institutions to take on the daunting task of providing a long-run series of GDP for 
Italy, spanning from unification (1861) until the 1950s (Istat 1957). On the whole, 
however, the results were disappointing, not least due to the opacity of sources and 
methods (e.g., Fenoaltea 2010). From the 1950s (Gerschenkron 1955; Fenoaltea 1969) 
until the present day (Fenoealtea 2003, 2005; Carreras and Felice 2010; Battilani, 
Felice, and Zamagni 2014), economic historians have tried to address the main flaws by 
reconstructing their own indices of national production for specific sectors and periods. 
Just recently, under the joint auspices of the Bank of Italy, Istat, and the University of 
Rome II, these efforts have been unified in a long-run series of Italy’s GDP, at both 
current and constant prices and spanning 150 years, with fully verifiable procedures and 
sources (Baffigi 2011; Brunetti, Felice, and Vecchi 2011). Soon after its release the new 
series was further updated (Felice and Vecchi 2015) to include the last advances in the 
literature covering the interwar years (Felice and Carreras 2012). We make use of this 
latest series.  
In the case of Spain, we take advantage of the estimate by Leandro Prados de la 
Escosura (2003), which was incorporated into Maddison’s (2010) work. It was not the 
only available series: Recently, Jordi Maluquer de Motes (2009a) published in Revista 
de Economía Aplicada an alternative estimate of Spanish GDP at current and constant 
prices. The reply by Prados de la Escosura (2009) and a further clarification by 
Maluquer de Motes (2009b) were jointly published in the same journal. The two series 
are quite different. For the years 1850 to 1970 the one by Maluquer is on average 24.5% 
higher than the one by Prados, and thus Spain’s backwardness compared with the rest 
of Europe is significantly reduced (Escudero and Simón 2010: 234). The main reason 
for this discrepancy is the way in which different series at constant prices, based on 
different base years, are linked in 1958, that is, in the year when the reconstruction by 
economic historians (1850–1958) and that by the official national accounts (1958 to 
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date) meet. Since the value from the latter is higher,32 a major problem is how to bridge 
the difference. Maluquer chooses to consider the new estimate from national accounts 
to be superior. Therefore, he accepts the difference, which is then rescaled to the 
historical series from 1958 backwards.33 Prados’s alternative strategy is to instead 
consider the historical estimate made at historical prices as more reliable than the new 
estimate made with a more recent price system and taxonomy, and thus to reject the 
difference for 1958 (i.e., to take as good the lower value). The difference is then 
distributed onwards until the next base year for the constant-price series, in this case 
1995. More specifically, it is allocated from 1958 to 1995, with weights increasing with 
the distance from 1958 (Prados de la Escosura 2009: 12–14). As a consequence, 
Prados’s series remains unchanged from 1958 backwards (although the growth rate 
from 1958 to 1995 is probably artificially increased). A second source of discrepancy is 
the fact that Maluquer uses one single deflator for all the series, the consumer price 
index, rather than implicit sectoral deflators, as Prados does. Prados’s approach in this 
is much more data-demanding, as well as more accurate, since it considers not only 
consumption but also investment goods. Prados’s approach pays more attention to the 
actual value of production in the past by assuming that the historical estimates in the 
base year at historical prices are more reliable than the subsequent estimates made with 
different price systems and taxonomy.34 Since we are interested in a comparison with 
Italy we choose Prados’s estimate, because both its deflation system based on implicit 
deflators and the redistributing rule used to link deflators with different base years are 
conceptually the same as the methods used for reconstructing the Italian series (and 
they are also in line with Maddison’s approach, i.e., with the series we use for France). 
Indeed, the two countries now have GDP series that are very similar in methodological 
terms, and thus comparable, not least because the base years used to produce constant 
price estimates are now close, especially for the liberal age (from Italy’s unification 
until the First World War) when Prados’s estimates are made at 1913 constant prices 
and Italy’s new series at 1911 constant prices (instead of 1870 prices, as with 
Maddison’s previous figures for Italy).35 
                                                          
32 As usual, and mostly due to the different price basis used. This happens because when prices and quantities 
are inversely correlated, late-weight indices, such as those of national accounts, tend to grow more slowly 
than early-weight ones (e.g., Gerschenkron 1947). See also Felice (2016). 
33 Namely, for 1958, Maluquer enlaces his series with the official accounts produced by Uriel, Moltó, and 
Cucarella (2000), which in 1958 have a GDP 10.7% higher than that estimated by Prados (Maluquer de 
Motes, 2009b: 35). 
34 Although there might be some reasons for preferring Maluquer’s index, for instance, the use of some 
updated historical information: the new series of population estimated by Maluquer himself (Maluquer de 
Motes 2008). As we will explain, here this series is incorporated into Prados’s index, since this can be 
achieved without risk of weakening the consistency of Prados’s estimates. 
35 The other base years are 1929 and 1958 for Spain (Prados de la Escosura, 2003: 46–85) and 1938 and 1951 
for Italy (Baffigi 2011: 56–59; Brunetti, Felice, and Vecchi 2011: 234). For the previous Italian series, see 
Maddison (1991). 
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Both series are expressed in a common unit of measure, 1990 international Geary–
Khamis purchasing power parity dollars (hereafter 1990 G-K dollars). For Spain, in 
Maddison (2010), Prados’s series of the total GDP is already expressed in 1990 G-K 
dollars. For Italy, we adopt the same conversion procedure used by Maddison in all of 
his estimates: a) the series of Italian GDP, expressed in its own national currency and at 
constant prices, is converted to an index; b) for the baseline year 1990, Italy’s GDP, 
expressed in its own national currency and at current prices, is converted to 1990 
international dollars using the Geary–Khamis PPP deflator;36 c) with the index in a) and 
the value in b), a new national series in Geary–Khamis PPP 1990 international dollars is 
created.37 In order to ensure full compatibility, we take the GDP figures for Italy, Spain, 
and France from the same source, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (2014) statistics.38 The results are displayed in Table  
A-1. 
Maddison’s method has the advantage of maintaining, for each country, the same 
original growth rates throughout the years of the series. However, it has the 
disadvantage of using only one purchasing power parity, distant in time from the early 
years, following the (quite unrealistic) assumption that differences in the cost of living 
between Italy and Spain did not alter over more than a century. Since 1997 the OECD 
(2014) has produced reliable PPP figures regularly. We use its 2008 benchmark, 
corresponding to the last year of our data, in order to re-scale our series to allow for 
more recent differences in the cost of living. In order to produce the series at 2008 
international purchasing power parity dollars, the procedure we adopt is the same as for 
the series at 1990 international dollars (GDP at current prices for 2008 is taken from the 
same OECD source). The results are displayed in Table A-2. We find them to be 
unrealistic. As can be seen, Spain would rank much closer to Italy and France (and 
Italy, in turn, to France) than what we know from established historical literature. The 
reason is probably the fact that, for these countries, recent PPPs reflect remarkably 
different trends in the national consumer price index caused by the introduction of the 
                                                          
36 The Geary–Khamis purchasing power converters for OECD countries are provided in Maddison (2006: 
189). For Italy the ratio is 1384.11 liras to 1 G-K dollar. 
37 This method has the advantage of maintaining, for each country, the same original growth rates throughout 
the years of the series. However, it has the disadvantage of using only one purchasing power parity, distant in 
time from the early years, following the (quite unrealistic) assumption that the differences in the cost of living 
between Italy and Spain did not alter over more than a century. Prados de la Escosura (2000) estimated 
current-price purchasing power parities in benchmark years spanning from 1820 to 1990 for a number of 
advanced countries, including Italy and Spain, by retropolating the relationship between PPPs and basic 
economic characteristics measured in the second half of the 20th century. See forward for more details.  
38 As a result, OECD GDP in 1990 is slightly lower than for Italy (‒1.8%) and a bit higher than for Spain 
(+5.8%) and France (+2.3%), and therefore the three series have been correspondingly rescaled. Population 
figures are from Table A-3 for Italy and Spain, from Maddison (2010) for France. 
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euro in 2002. As a consequence, we have chosen not to use the 2008 benchmark in our 
paper. 
Backwards in time, in benchmark years spanning from 1820 to 1990, Prados de la 
Escosura (2000) has estimated current-price purchasing power parities for a number of 
advanced countries − including Italy, Spain and France − by retropolating the 
relationship between PPPs and basic economic characteristics measured in the second 
half of the 20th century. We prefer not to use Prados’s converters at this stage, mainly 
because retropolated PPPs are inevitably less reliable and not as widely accepted as the 
current OECD ones. Furthermore, our goal is to compare the original series of GDP and 
to analyse their intrinsic cycles. In this respect, the use of too many different PPP 
systems would make our results less transparent, since we would not be able to 
differentiate between the impact of movements in the national GDP cycles and in 
changes in the relative cost of living between the three countries. Both these reasons are 
all the more valid as using PPPs distant in time significantly changes results: According 
to the different PPPs used, Italy and Spain overtook France early in the 20th century or 
even in the 19th century. But a full discussion of these results (and hypotheses) would 
take another paper. Therefore, we limit ourselves to the 1990 PPP benchmark 
popularized by Maddison, and to the final benchmark of our series from the OECD. 
 
Table A-1: GDP per capita in Italy, Spain, and France at current borders,  
1861‒2008 (1990 PPP dollars)  
 Italy Spain France  Italy Spain France  Italy Spain France 
1861 1532 1336 1810 1911 2370 2156 3325 1961 6309 3701 7897 
1862 1553 1333 1958 1912 2373 2127 3596 1962 6689 4079 8254 
1863 1591 1354 2019 1913 2476 2200 3566 1963 7043 4447 8557 
1864 1593 1349 2034 1914 2359 2148 3311 1964 7259 4828 9024 
1865 1690 1303 1969 1915 2221 2159 3323 1965 7519 5089 9378 
1866 1688 1365 1979 1916 2383 2236 3543 1966 7960 5407 9766 
1867 1536 1354 1855 1917 2383 2190 3048 1967 8508 5704 10137 
1868 1569 1215 2028 1918 2314 2156 2452 1968 9058 5982 10505 
1869 1592 1254 2053 1919 2256 2177 2876 1969 9581 6463 11139 
1870 1630 1284 1920 1920 2294 2321 3302 1970 10080 6784 11675 
1871 1594 1383 1943 1921 2205 2362 3146 1971 10183 7111 12120 
1872 1558 1571 2126 1922 2370 2436 3694 1972 10514 7621 12549 
1873 1549 1705 1967 1923 2558 2445 3841 1973 11160 8218 13122 
1874 1628 1559 2207 1924 2604 2494 4276 1974 11680 8743 13417 
1875 1637 1601 2271 1925 2776 2624 4263 1975 11351 8952 13258 
1876 1599 1626 2075 1926 2777 2588 4348 1976 12083 9222 13779 
1877 1608 1787 2176 1927 2688 2782 4250 1977 12331 9472 14236 
1878 1647 1733 2140 1928 2822 2764 4534 1978 12679 9679 14571 
1879 1652 1627 1998 1929 2940 2928 4819 1979 13387 9719 14974 
1880 1673 1761 2169 1930 2788 2798 4637 1980 13808 9853 15109 
1881 1730 1794 2245 1931 2724 2691 4333 1981 13901 9827 15185 
1882 1751 1805 2341 1932 2756 2706 4051 1982 13948 9937 15483 
1883 1769 1837 2341 1933 2704 2610 4337 1983 14073 10129 15599 
1884 1745 1832 2305 1934 2678 2670 4289 1984 14511 10222 15739 
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Table A-1: (Continued) 
 Italy Spain France  Italy Spain France  Italy Spain France 
1885 1772 1777 2258 1935 2807 2688 4181 1985 14900 10381 15891 
1886 1809 1732 2289 1936 2685 2062 4343 1986 15317 10679 16201 
1887 1857 1698 2301 1937 2968 1884 4591 1987 15806 11243 16533 
1888 1848 1759 2322 1938 3069 1878 4570 1988 16465 11816 17180 
1889 1796 1751 2376 1939 3190 2045 4904 1989 17018 12401 17702 
1890 1796 1750 2431 1940 3041 2222 4136 1990 17363 12918 18057 
1891 1822 1786 2488 1941 2927 2172 3386 1991 17617 13207 18167 
1892 1824 1913 2551 1942 2736 2287 3050 1992 17761 13274 18412 
1893 1852 1837 2594 1943 2303 2354 2926 1993 17567 13085 18135 
1894 1860 1851 2687 1944 1893 2442 2478 1994 17914 13350 18426 
1895 1875 1831 2629 1945 1712 2256 2633 1995 18424 13675 18775 
1896 1902 1683 2747 1946 2329 2335 3945 1996 18638 13964 18896 
1897 1906 1764 2700 1947 2739 2353 4234 1997 18973 14462 19262 
1898 1896 1880 2824 1948 2950 2336 4495 1998 19241 15068 19659 
1899 1918 1888 2979 1949 3145 2297 5061 1999 19531 15716 20213 
1900 1965 1915 2943 1950 3396 2351 5306 2000 20238 16485 20896 
1901 2001 2036 2892 1951 3693 2569 5588 2001 20596 17026 21164 
1902 2036 1960 2839 1952 3844 2762 5693 2002 20637 17267 21260 
1903 2056 1948 2897 1953 4105 2730 5816 2003 20557 17510 21376 
1904 2097 1924 2913 1954 4234 2914 6052 2004 20761 17791 21756 
1905 2142 1885 2961 1955 4495 3007 6343 2005 20705 18130 22036 
1906 2220 1970 3011 1956 4687 3226 6598 2006 21049 18570 22429 
1907 2262 2021 3141 1957 4929 3302 6919 2007 21302 18893 22804 
1908 2313 2087 3116 1958 5185 3412 7014 2008 20902 18762 22739 
1909 2335 2109 3241 1959 5525 3300 7141     
1910 2344 2023 3034 1960 5877 3317 7570     
 
Sources: For Italy, Felice and Vecchi (2015a); for Spain, Prados de la Escosura (2003) and Maddison (2010); for France, Maddison 
(2010). For all the three countries, 1990 GDP at current price in the national currency is from OECD (2014). For Italy and Spain the 
series are based on the de facto population (see Table A.3). For further details see main text. 
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Table A-2: GDP per capita in Italy, Spain, and France at current borders, 1861‒
2008 (2008 PPP dollars)  
 Italy Spain France  Italy Spain France  Italy Spain France 
1861 2440 2359 2723 1911 3774 3807 5003 1961 10048 6535 11880 
1862 2473 2353 2946 1912 3779 3756 5409 1962 10653 7203 12417 
1863 2534 2391 3037 1913 3943 3885 5364 1963 11217 7853 12873 
1864 2537 2382 3060 1914 3757 3794 4981 1964 11561 8527 13575 
1865 2692 2300 2962 1915 3536 3813 5000 1965 11974 8987 14107 
1866 2689 2410 2977 1916 3794 3949 5330 1966 12678 9549 14691 
1867 2447 2391 2791 1917 3794 3868 4585 1967 13550 10073 15249 
1868 2498 2145 3051 1918 3685 3807 3688 1968 14426 10563 15804 
1869 2536 2215 3088 1919 3593 3845 4327 1969 15259 11413 16756 
1870 2595 2268 2888 1920 3654 4099 4967 1970 16053 11980 17563 
1871 2539 2442 2923 1921 3511 4170 4733 1971 16217 12557 18233 
1872 2481 2773 3199 1922 3774 4301 5557 1972 16744 13458 18878 
1873 2467 3010 2958 1923 4074 4318 5778 1973 17773 14512 19740 
1874 2592 2753 3320 1924 4148 4403 6433 1974 18601 15438 20184 
1875 2608 2826 3416 1925 4421 4634 6413 1975 18078 15807 19944 
1876 2547 2872 3122 1926 4423 4570 6540 1976 19244 16284 20728 
1877 2561 3156 3274 1927 4281 4913 6394 1977 19638 16726 21416 
1878 2623 3061 3219 1928 4495 4880 6820 1978 20193 17093 21919 
1879 2631 2874 3006 1929 4682 5170 7250 1979 21320 17163 22526 
1880 2664 3110 3263 1930 4440 4941 6976 1980 21991 17399 22729 
1881 2755 3167 3377 1931 4338 4752 6519 1981 22139 17354 22843 
1882 2789 3188 3522 1932 4388 4778 6094 1982 22213 17547 23292 
1883 2817 3245 3522 1933 4307 4610 6525 1983 22413 17886 23466 
1884 2780 3235 3468 1934 4265 4716 6453 1984 23110 18051 23677 
1885 2822 3139 3397 1935 4470 4746 6289 1985 23729 18331 23905 
1886 2881 3059 3443 1936 4276 3640 6533 1986 24394 18857 24371 
1887 2958 2999 3462 1937 4726 3326 6907 1987 25173 19853 24871 
1888 2944 3107 3493 1938 4887 3317 6874 1988 26223 20866 25844 
1889 2861 3091 3574 1939 5081 3612 7378 1989 27103 21899 26629 
1890 2861 3090 3657 1940 4843 3924 6222 1990 27652 22812 27163 
1891 2902 3154 3743 1941 4662 3835 5093 1991 28057 23321 27330 
1892 2905 3377 3837 1942 4357 4038 4589 1992 28287 23440 27698 
1893 2950 3245 3902 1943 3668 4157 4402 1993 27977 23107 27280 
1894 2963 3269 4042 1944 3014 4312 3728 1994 28531 23575 27719 
1895 2986 3233 3954 1945 2727 3983 3961 1995 29342 24148 28244 
1896 3030 2972 4133 1946 3708 4123 5934 1996 29683 24659 28426 
1897 3036 3114 4062 1947 4362 4155 6369 1997 30216 25538 28977 
1898 3019 3320 4248 1948 4698 4125 6762 1998 30643 26607 29574 
1899 3055 3334 4481 1949 5009 4057 7613 1999 31106 27753 30407 
1900 3130 3381 4427 1950 5408 4152 7983 2000 32231 29110 31435 
1901 3186 3595 4350 1951 5882 4536 8406 2001 32802 30066 31838 
1902 3243 3461 4271 1952 6122 4877 8564 2002 32866 30492 31983 
1903 3274 3440 4358 1953 6538 4822 8749 2003 32739 30920 32157 
1904 3339 3398 4382 1954 6743 5145 9105 2004 33065 31416 32728 
1905 3411 3328 4455 1955 7159 5310 9542 2005 32975 32016 33150 
1906 3535 3480 4530 1956 7465 5696 9925 2006 33523 32792 33741 
1907 3602 3568 4726 1957 7850 5831 10409 2007 33926 33362 34306 
1908 3683 3686 4687 1958 8258 6026 10552 2008 33288 33131 34207 
1909 3719 3724 4875 1959 8799 5827 10743     
1910 3733 3572 4564 1960 9360 5857 11387     
 
Sources: see Table A-1. 
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All the series for Italy and Spain are revised to include the present population, as 
opposed to the resident population used in previous figures. GDP is the sum of all 
payments to factors of production owned by people living in a country, regardless of 
their nationality: Thus, it includes income earned by individuals not officially living in 
that country. Gross National Production (GNP) is the sum of all payments to factors of 
production owned by the residents in a country and thus includes income earned abroad 
by the citizens of that country. As a consequence, technically it is only GNP that should 
be divided by the resident population: GDP should be divided by the de facto 
population (that is, by the present or actual population). For Italy, in order to obtain the 
revised series, first we must estimate a series of the de facto Italian population at the 
present boundaries. This is achieved through a few simple steps using the data of the de 
facto population at historical borders from official censuses in benchmark years, and the 
long-run series of the resident population at historical and at present boundaries from 
Istat (2012a).39 For Spain, Maluquer de Motes (2008) has recently made available a 
new estimate of the Spanish population, which provides a series that is for the first time 
geographically and methodologically consistent throughout the different periods of 
Spanish history and that always refers to the de facto population. Therefore, we 
incorporate his data in order to produce up-to-date estimates of the per capita GDP 
based on the de facto population,40 comparable with those available for Italy. The 
difference between resident and present populations usually increases with emigration 
(or, for the last years, with immigration). This is why these differences are historically 
important for Italy (especially during the Giolitti age, but indeed throughout most of the 
Italian history) as well as, to a minor degree, for Spain. In this latter case, the 
differences between the old and the new population series are also noteworthy for the 
years following the 1929 crisis, for which Maluquer’s new data includes emigrants 
returning from abroad for the first time. As a result, we have higher figures for the 
population and lower figures for the GDP per capita. Emigration is also why such 
differences are far less important for a country like France: Throughout the 19th century 
no more than half a million French people emigrated. It is true that France experienced 
more immigration, but this only affects the last decades (lowering the level of GDP per 
capita of the French and thus increasing Italy and Spain’s rate of convergence in the last 
stretch, not in the whole series). The new series of the de facto population for Italy and 
                                                          
39 In more detail, as the first step, the benchmarks of the de facto population at the historical borders (referring 
to the years 1861, 1871, 1881, 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1931, 1936, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 
2011) are interpolated, with the geometric average using the cycles of the resident population at the historical 
borders. In this way, a series of the de facto population at the historical borders is obtained. As the second 
step, the series of the de facto population at the historical borders is converted into the series of the de facto 
population at the present borders, using for each year the coefficient “population at historical 
borders/population at current borders” from the series of the resident population.  
40 We divide Prados’s series of total GDP by Maluquer’s series of de facto population (at 1 July). 
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Spain are presented in Table A-3. The same table also displays yearly differences with 
the previous series of the resident population, used in the previous figures of GDP per 
capita (from Istat, 2012a, for Italy; from Maddison, 2010, for Spain), so that the impact 
of the revision on our new figures of per capita GDP can be easily gauged. 
 
Table A-3: De facto population in Italy and Spain at current borders, 1861‒2008 
(thousands) 
 Italy Spain Pop. de facto minus 
resident population 
 Italy Spain Pop. de facto minus 
resident population 
   Italy Spain    Italy Spain 
1861 25770 15729 –558 30 1935 41824 25317 –768 738 
1862 25935 15870 –572 116 1936 42169 25655 –739 845 
1863 26123 15982 –589 173 1937 41908 25773 –1320 730 
1864 26324 16067 –591 203 1938 41677 25831 –1933 552 
1865 26528 16121 –603 201 1939 42221 25601 –1898 84 
1866 26756 16188 –625 212 1940 42795 25846 –1767 89 
1867 26908 16283 –532 251 1941 43292 26021 –1593 42 
1868 26995 16317 –566 229 1942 43672 26094 –1447 –88 
1869 27172 16308 –629 164 1943 43960 26284 –1275 –103 
1870 27375 16327 –599 126 1944 44191 26516 –1153 –78 
1871 27546 16365 –605 107 1945 44460 26765 –1080 –37 
1872 27717 16405 –597 90 1946 44859 27018 –1051 6 
1873 27872 16446 –587 74 1947 45292 27248 –918 25 
1874 27992 16487 –559 58 1948 45752 27526 –800 89 
1875 28119 16529 –590 42 1949 46225 27801 –689 150 
1876 28325 16570 –639 25 1950 46720 28017 –575 –46 
1877 28556 16612 –613 9 1951 47159 28185 –381 –113 
1878 28742 16686 –592 9 1952 47373 28360 –419 –190 
1879 28916 16790 –600 22 1953 47630 28588 –493 –216 
1880 29027 16893 –525 34 1954 47937 28819 –540 –241 
1881 29167 17011 –624 60 1955 48235 29040 –554 –279 
1882 29365 17122 –640 79 1956 48487 29268 –567 –311 
1883 29552 17202 –669 66 1957 48713 29509 –600 –333 
1884 29777 17298 –734 68 1958 48970 29788 –670 –318 
1885 30025 17356 –751 33 1959 49289 30100 –737 –273 
1886 30209 17425 –728 7 1960 49617 30418 –757 –223 
1887 30373 17532 –787 19 1961 49904 30764 –795 –140 
1888 30538 17604 –787 4 1962 50258 31110 –802 –48 
1889 30733 17654 –878 –24 1963 50647 31452 –797 22 
1890 30936 17674 –856 –83 1964 51083 31821 –824 80 
1891 31097 17709 –895 –127 1965 51504 32186 –814 101 
1892 31303 17773 –886 –143 1966 51884 32550 –836 98 
1893 31522 17847 –895 –149 1967 52256 32932 –825 82 
1894 31740 17911 –868 –165 1968 52612 33288 –779 49 
1895 31923 17956 –847 –201 1969 52980 33580 –705 14 
1896 32105 17978 –850 –260 1970 53362 33832 –596 –44 
1897 32328 18034 –872 –286 1971 53745 34118 –444 –77 
1898 32542 18208 –827 –194 1972 54113 34468 –461 –45 
1899 32752 18431 –853 –53 1973 54553 34818 –376 –19 
1900 32946 18573 –793 7 1974 54991 35162 –302 –22 
1901 33159 18682 –856 23 1975 55345 35547 –244 –17 
1902 33391 18840 –925 52 1976 55622 35984 –226 –13 
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Table A-3: (Continued) 
 Italy Spain Pop. de facto minus 
resident population 
 Italy Spain Pop. de facto minus 
resident population 
   Italy Spain    Italy Spain 
1903 33603 19041 –952 122 1977 55852 36430 –211 –9 
1904 33823 19216 –1052 166 1978 56043 36838 –204 –23 
1905 34059 19342 –1088 209 1979 56181 37208 –207 8 
1906 34284 19451 –1162 135 1980 56275 37535 –204 47 
1907 34519 19564 –1223 114 1981 56336 37829 –188 78 
1908 34762 19690 –1293 105 1982 56388 38081 –175 98 
1909 35012 19821 –1358 100 1983 56501 38306 –64 122 
1910 35305 19940 –1469 82 1984 56586 38507 –2 144 
1911 35583 20054 –1476 60 1985 56638 38690 40 155 
1912 35891 20175 –1350 47 1986 56659 38852 65 144 
1913 36071 20299 –1184 36 1987 56674 39001 65 120 
1914 36425 20494 –1372 96 1988 56697 39138 48 84 
1915 36955 20733 –1211 198 1989 56719 39260 25 45 
1916 37198 20938 –920 265 1990 56742 39367 –2 16 
1917 37128 21124 –716 313 1991 56765 39487 –8 26 
1918 36764 21306 –431 356 1992 56784 39650 –37 101 
1919 36585 21226 –719 135 1993 56896 39807 54 179 
1920 36817 21348 –674 116 1994 56973 39948 129 257 
1921 37192 21506 –698 95 1995 56993 40074 149 324 
1922 37568 21736 –713 108 1996 57010 40190 134 386 
1923 37923 21933 –706 86 1997 57047 40307 143 452 
1924 38253 22114 –737 45 1998 57043 40421 134 515 
1925 38588 22314 –751 22 1999 57021 40529 97 576 
1926 38906 22545 –759 27 2000 57061 40654 100 638 
1927 39232 22787 –798 40 2001 57110 40797 116 710 
1928 39550 23029 –792 52 2002 57551 41314 230 1161 
1929 39813 23277 –782 67 2003 57984 42005 96 1788 
1930 40114 23536 –873 91 2004 58408 42692 –54 2411 
1931 40434 23856 –843 181 2005 58822 43398 70 3057 
1932 40756 24236 –829 339 2006 59223 44068 92 3670 
1933 41101 24625 –820 503 2007 59610 44874 –9 4426 
1934 41465 24982 –800 633 2008 59983 45593 –62 5102 
 
Sources: for Italy, see main text for de facto population and Istat (2012a) for resident population; for Spain, Maluquer de Motes 
(2008b) until 2001 and Ine (2012) for the years 2002 to 2008 for population de facto and Maddison (2010) for resident population. 
 
 
A-2 Life expectancy 
Measures based on GDP are not the only indicators of economic growth, nor of human 
welfare. A wide range of social indicators, from per capita calories to average height to 
life expectancy, can be integrated with GDP or used to supplement it (not only because 
of the lack of GDP historical figures (Steckel 2009)), combined in composite indicators 
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(of which the Human Development Index (HDI) is by far the most successful)41 or 
considered individually in a ‘dashboard’ approach.42 Although estimating social 
indicators for past periods is not, in principle, more difficult than reconstructing GDP  
(in fact the latter poses far greater conceptual problems),43 international historical series 
of social indicators are seriously lacking. Nothing exists that is comparable with the 
impressive reach of the Maddison project, criticisable as it may be. Before 1950, 
typically only benchmark estimates are available for education, height, and nutrition. 
The situation is a little better for life expectancy, for which a number of consistent 
national series are indeed available, mostly thanks to the efforts of the Max Planck 
Institute for Demographic Research and the University of California (the Human 
Mortality Database, HMD hereafter).44 However, this database does not always include 
research produced by economic historians in specific countries, which, if properly 
assessed and possibly incorporated, could be invaluable for enlarging both the 
international scope and the historical coverage of the database. For Italy, a wide range 
of social indicators in benchmark years has been published in a recent book by 
Giovanni Vecchi (2011). An alternative and more recent estimate has also been 
published in the case of life expectancy, in benchmark years from 1871 to the present 
day (Felice and Vasta 2015). For Spain, the Nisal research project has made available a 
wide range of social and well-being indicators, including historical estimates of life 
expectancy previously published by Roser Nicolau (2005).45 Furthermore, we now have 
new estimates of life expectancy in benchmark years for Spain (Cabré, Domingo, and 
Menacho 2002) and even a yearly series from 1911 to 2004 (Blanes Llorens 2007), both 
of which have thus far not been considered by the HMD.  
Thanks to this information, and to the available historical series published in the 
HMD, it is now possible to produce historical and consistent series of life expectancy 
for both Italy and Spain from 1861 to 2008, which are directly comparable with the 
GDP series in the previous section. These new series are presented and discussed here 
for the first time.  
For Italy, the basic references are the estimates recently published by Felice and 
Vasta (2015), in benchmark years spanning from 1871 to 2007. From 1911 onwards 
these estimates are roughly the same as those published in the HMD.46 However, in the 
                                                          
41 UNDP, United Nations Development Programme (2010). For historical cross-country estimates, see Crafts 
(1997, 2002) and Prados de la Escosura (2010b); for Italy, see Brandolini and Vecchi (2011) and Felice and 
Vasta (2015); for Spain, see Escudero and Simón (2010). 
42 Ravallion (2012). For Italy, see Vecchi (2011). 
43 Cfr. Felice (2016). 
44 Freely available at: http://www.mortality.org/ (last access on November 2014). 
45 Freely available at: http://www.proyectonisal.org/ (last access on November 2014). 
46 The Human Mortality Database provides a yearly series, at historical borders, from 1871 to 2008. Both 
Felice-Vasta and the HMD differ from the benchmark estimates (which are also at historical borders) 
published by Vecchi (2011, p. 419), but the reasons for this discrepancy are unknown at present, because in 
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previous period, where the HMD researchers themselves consider their figures to be far 
less trustworthy, there are differences between the two.47 All these estimates − those by 
Felice and Vasta as well as those by the HMD, and even those by Vecchi − are at 
historical borders. Thus, for a proper time-series analysis, they need to be converted to 
current borders. This is made possible by the fact that Felice and Vasta also report life 
expectancy data for the Italian regions at their historical borders. We make the 
conversion under the hypothesis that the ratio between life expectancy in Trentino-Alto 
Adige and part of what is now Friuli-Venezia Giulia (including Trieste) on the one 
hand, and the rest of Italy on the other hand, remained unchanged from the liberal age 
(when Trentino-Alto Adige and part of Friuli-Venezia Giulia were not part of the Italian 
Realm) to the interwar years (when these provinces were annexed after the First World 
War). Once we have estimated the new benchmarks at current borders (for 1871, 1891, 
1911, 1931, 1938, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2007), the yearly series is 
constructed by interpolating through the benchmarks the yearly series of the HMD 
(2011b), through a geometric average. From 1861 to 1870 the series is produced by 
projecting backwards the value of life expectancy in 1871, with the inverse of the 
mortality rate on the resident population for the years 1862 to 1871.48 
If for Italy we have three sources of historical data for life expectancy, for Spain 
there are four sources. First, there are the benchmark figures published by Roser 
Nicolau (2005), mostly based on estimates by the Spanish Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (INE), which run every ten years from 1900 to 1970 and every five years 
from 1970 onwards, with a last benchmark in 1998. Second, for the years 1908 to 2008, 
a yearly series by the HMD (2011c) is available. There are some differences between 
the benchmarks of Nicolau and those of the HMD series, due to different procedures for 
computing the population of Ceuta and Melilla and to the changes between the de facto 
population and the resident population. It is worth noticing, however, that the HMD 
researchers do not seem to be aware of the previous work by Roser Nicolau,49 so they 
do not raise the issue (Glei et al. 2012). As a third source, we have the work by Fausto 
Dopico and David-Sven Reher referring to the second half of the 19th century and to the 
first half of the 20th, which consists of mortality estimates for Spain in the 1860s 
(Dopico 1987), and of life tables for four ten-year benchmarks from 1900 to 1930 
(Dopico and Reher 1999). Their research efficaciously addresses many of the problems 
                                                                                                                                             
the explanatory notes of Vecchi (2011: 128–9), reference is made to an unpublished graduate thesis; in the 
case of Felice and Vasta, see the discussion on p. 35. 
47 Since “deaths counts are available only by five-year age groups (i.e., 0‒4, 5-9,…, 65‒74, 75+)” and “the 
data for 1883–84 demonstrate clear patterns of age heaping” (Glei 2011: 3).  
48 The series of the mortality rate is available from Istat (2012b), for all the years 1862 to 2009; as expected, 
the correlation between mortality and life expectancy, for the years 1871 to 2009, is very high: a Pearson 
coefficient of -0.955, with R2 of 0.911. The value for 1861 is interpolated linearly, through a linear regression 
for the years 1862–1880, in which the year is the independent variable and life expectancy the dependent one. 
49 Whose first version was published as early as 1989 (Nicolau 1989). 
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posed by the original sources for those years and has become a reference for historical 
analyses of life expectancy in Spain (e.g., Pérez Moreda, Reher, and Sanz Gimeno 
2015: 292–299), as well as for further estimates concerning those periods.50 These latter 
– and here we come to the fourth source – have been produced by Anna Cabré and her 
co-authors and more recently by Amand Blanes Llorens, who was a PhD student of 
Cabré. At first, Cabré, Domingo, and Menacho (2002: 127; Cabré 1999: 38–42) 
published five-year estimates of life expectancy in Spain, beginning as early as 1860 
and running until 1995. Their reliability is more limited for the second half of the 19th 
century, when, due to lack of data, Cabré’s figures have been constructed from Dopico 
(1987) and Dopico and Reher (1999) estimates for 1866 and 1990 respectively, via 
interpolating mortality rates by age groups – with the exception of 1885 when, due to a 
cholera epidemic, ad hoc mortality and life expectancy have been estimated (Cabré 
1999: 243–253). In any case, for that period these are the only available series, and have 
been produced by making use of the most reliable sources and of widely accepted 
procedures. A few years afterwards, a PhD student of Cabré published a yearly series of 
life expectancy in Spain, from 1911 until 2004, as part of his PhD thesis (Blanes 
Llorens 2007)51. This work is truly impressive, boasting a level of accuracy and detail 
superior to that by the HMD (which is apparently also unaware of this work, unlike 
Blanes Llorens, who discusses their work);52 moreover, the results have never been 
published outside the PhD thesis and are presented here to a wider public for the first 
time.  
The higher level of accuracy of the work by Blanes Llorens can be exemplified by 
the way of coping with under-registration of infant mortality, an issue that indeed has 
an impact on the overall trend of life expectancy in Spain when compared with Italy, as 
we will see in the next section. According to Spanish law, until 1974 newborns that 
died within the first 24 hours of life were counted in the official censuses as aborted 
foetuses, or stillbirths, while from 1975 onwards they were included in the mortality 
tables. Therefore, deaths were under-registered until 1974. In order to estimate life 
expectancy, Blanes Llorens re-counts the number of these ‘false’ stillbirths from the 
demographic statistics (Movimiento Natural de la Población) of the Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística (INE) from 1911 to 1975, and with these figures he recalculates the 
figures from vital statistics and censuses. He then modifies his tables accordingly to 
make them fully comparable with the following period (Blanes Llorens 2007: 57–59). 
                                                          
50 They are not, however, the only noteworthy recent research concerning the 19th century and the first half of 
the 20th century. Remarkable is the work by Diego Ramiro Fariñas and Alberto Sanz Gimeno on childhood 
mortality in central Spain, over the long-run (Ramiro Fariñas and Sanz Gimeno 2000a, 2000b), which also 
was considered in the work by Blanes Llorens (2007) we mostly rely upon. 
51 We are grateful to the author for having let us use the data from his PhD thesis. 
52 For a full description of sources and methods, see Blanes Llorens (2007: 43–114). 
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The HMD researchers also cope with this problem, but they correct infant death counts 
only from 1930 onwards (Glei et al. 2012: 3–5).53  
Once we have accepted the new figures as superior, the only (minor) problem is 
that both the estimated series by Blanes Llorens and the benchmark data by Cabré, 
Domingo, and Menacho are reported by sex, with no averages for the whole population. 
Averages must therefore be calculated via the series of the population by sex, which is 
reconstructed from the data of the official censuses for benchmark years (see Nicolau 
2005).54 At this point, the different life expectancy data for the whole population is 
linked and unified, with the aim of producing an updated and more coherent series of 
life expectancy for Spain.55 To this purpose, for the years 1911 to 2004, we use the 
series from Blanes Llorens (2007). The same series are linked to the five-year estimates 
by Cabré, Domingo, and Menacho (2002) from 1861 to 1910.56 In order to complete the 
cycle, from 1861 to 1910, estimates by Cabré, Domingo, and Menacho are interpolated 
every five years, through a geometric average, using the series of the inverse of 
mortality rates until 190757 from Nicolau (2005), then limited to the last two years of 
the HMD series (2011c). For the very last stretch (2005–2008), we link the estimates by 
Blanes Llorens to the HMD series. Needless to say, in the overlapping years of the last 
period the figures are virtually identical.  
It is worth stressing that, for both Italy and Spain, we never use a linear 
interpolation. For some years (Italy from 1861 to 1870, Spain from 1861 to 1910), we 
interpolate the new and more reliable benchmarks using the mortality series. In the case 
                                                          
53 However, neither Blanes Llorens nor HMD researchers were the first to correct estimates of infant mortality 
to allow for the under-registration of deaths. Marcelino Pascua Martínes pioneered these efforts as far back as 
in the 1930s (Pascua Martínes 1934), followed by Antonio Arbelo Curbelo (1951). By the early 1990s, 
Arbelo Curbelo’s procedure was the same as that adopted by Rosa Gómez Redondo, one of the main 
contributors to the HMD for Spain (Gómez Redondo 1992). 
54 Namely, historical data of the population by sex are available for the following benchmarks: 1860, 1877, 
1887, 1897, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1981, 1991, and 2001, plus 2010. The annual 
series of the shares of the female (and male) population is constructed via linearly interpolating the shares of 
the benchmarks, through the continuous compounded annual rate. 
55 The main divergence between this new series and the previous one is in levels, concentrated in 1930 and 
essentially due to the under registration of births. Therefore, in terms of yearly movements there are no great 
differences in the long-run series; however there are in terms of structural breaks. In a previous work, an 
alternative series constructed by linking the Nicolau data through the HMD estimates is also tested, and the 
result displays some incongruities that make us doubt its reliability (see Felice and Pujol Andreu 2013: 27). 
56 It is worth noticing that for the following period, the five-year estimates by Cabré, Domingo, and Menacho 
are very close to the new figures by Blanes Llorens. 
57 Also in the case of Spain, for those years for which it is possible to check (i.e., from 1908 to 2001), we 
register a high correlation between mortality rates and life expectancy: a Pearson coefficient of ‒0.958 and R2 
of 0.918. In the series of mortality rates, the years 1871 to 1876 are missing, and from 1870 to 1877 they had 
to be reconstructed via linear interpolation through the continuous compounded annual rate. However, since 
we have an estimate of life expectancy for 1875, the years of linear interpolation are only four (1871 to 1874), 
plus one (1876). This is a shortcut that we make with bad conscience but good precedent (it is the usual way 
to cope with a few missing years in long-run series). 
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of Italy from 1871 onwards, we take the most reliable benchmark figures and 
interpolate them with the HMD yearly series. In the case of Spain from 1911 to 2004, 
we use the latest available yearly series (and the HMD yearly series for the last stretch). 
The new series of life expectancy for Italy and Spain are displayed in table A-4. 
 
Table A-4: Life expectancy at birth in Italy and Spain at current borders,  
1861‒2008 (years) 
 Italy Spain  Italy Spain  Italy Spain 
1861 32.1 30.3 1911 44.2 42.2 1961 70.1 69.7 
1862 32.0 31.0 1912 48.4 45.2 1962 69.4 69.7 
1863 31.9 30.4 1913 47.9 43.7 1963 69.5 69.8 
1864 33.1 29.7 1914 49.3 43.8 1964 70.6 70.6 
1865 33.0 29.1 1915 41.9 43.6 1965 70.5 71.0 
1866 33.9 34.1 1916 38.8 44.6 1966 71.2 71.2 
1867 33.1 32.6 1917 37.3 43.3 1967 71.2 71.4 
1868 32.4 28.7 1918 25.4 30.7 1968 71.0 71.7 
1869 35.5 28.3 1919 41.7 41.9 1969 71.1 71.2 
1870 33.1 30.1 1920 45.1 40.8 1970 71.8 72.2 
1871 33.2 30.3 1921 48.8 43.9 1971 72.1 71.8 
1872 33.6 30.5 1922 49.6 45.6 1972 72.3 73.0 
1873 35.5 30.7 1923 51.1 45.6 1973 72.2 72.8 
1874 35.4 30.9 1924 51.2 47.1 1974 72.8 73.1 
1875 34.7 31.1 1925 51.0 47.6 1975 72.7 73.6 
1876 36.9 31.2 1926 50.7 48.3 1976 73.0 73.9 
1877 38.1 31.3 1927 52.4 49.0 1977 73.3 74.3 
1878 37.2 31.5 1928 52.5 49.1 1978 73.6 74.5 
1879 36.5 32.0 1929 52.2 50.1 1979 73.8 75.0 
1880 35.0 32.1 1930 55.1 51.0 1980 73.7 75.5 
1881 36.3 31.4 1931 54.8 50.9 1981 74.0 75.7 
1882 36.2 30.5 1932 55.0 52.3 1982 74.5 76.3 
1883 37.0 32.1 1933 56.8 52.4 1983 74.4 76.1 
1884 38.4 28.3 1934 57.7 52.9 1984 75.2 76.5 
1885 38.5 31.7 1935 57.3 53.1 1985 75.3 76.4 
1886 36.6 32.9 1936 58.2 51.7 1986 75.7 76.7 
1887 37.3 33.5 1937 57.2 48.1 1987 76.2 77.0 
1888 38.2 34.9 1938 58.1 48.3 1988 76.4 76.9 
1889 40.3 34.1 1939 59.5 47.9 1989 76.8 77.0 
1890 39.5 34.1 1940 58.7 49.9 1990 76.9 77.0 
1891 39.4 34.4 1941 56.1 48.9 1991 76.9 77.1 
1892 39.5 34.7 1942 53.8 53.2 1992 77.3 77.5 
1893 40.1 34.6 1943 50.3 55.2 1993 77.6 77.7 
1894 39.9 34.1 1944 53.4 56.6 1994 77.8 78.1 
1895 39.3 35.0 1945 55.8 58.1 1995 78.0 78.2 
1896 40.1 34.5 1946 59.9 57.7 1996 78.4 78.3 
1897 42.4 35.6 1947 62.0 59.4 1997 78.6 78.8 
1898 41.1 35.6 1948 64.1 61.3 1998 78.7 78.9 
1899 42.1 34.7 1949 64.6 61.0 1999 79.1 78.9 
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Table A-4: (Continued) 
 Italy Spain  Italy Spain  Italy Spain 
1900 39.9 34.5 1950 66.1 62.3 2000 79.5 79.4 
1901 41.3 35.8 1951 65.5 61.9 2001 79.8 79.7 
1902 41.0 38.0 1952 66.1 65.0 2002 80.0 79.8 
1903 41.3 39.6 1953 66.8 65.7 2003 80.1 79.7 
1904 42.7 38.4 1954 68.1 66.9 2004 80.9 80.2 
1905 42.4 38.1 1955 68.5 66.7 2005 80.9 80.2 
1906 43.7 38.0 1956 67.9 66.7 2006 81.3 80.8 
1907 44.2 40.5 1957 68.0 66.6 2007 81.4 80.8 
1908 42.1 42.0 1958 69.1 68.8 2008 81.6 81.1 
1909 43.8 41.6 1959 69.5 68.7    
1910 46.0 41.5 1960 69.4 69.4    
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Online statistical appendix 
Part II. Additional econometric results 
Table A-5: Augmented Dickey‒Fuller tests for unit roots 
   ADF MacKinnon  p-value 
Italy GDP -1.942 0.633 
  ln (LE) -3.636 0.027 
  Modified LE 1.174 1.000 
  ∆ GDP -5.121 0.000 
  ∆ ln (LE) -7.618 0.000 
  ∆ Modified LE -6.089 0.000 
Spain GDP -0.712 0.972 
  ln (LE) -1.933 0.637 
  Modified LE -0.967 0.948 
  ∆ GDP -4.528 0.001 
  ∆ ln (LE) -6.209 0.000 
  ∆ Modified LE -5.626 0.000 
France GDP -2.295 0.437 
  ln (LE) -4.471 0.993 
  Modified LE -0.085 0.993 
  ∆ GDP -6.178 0.000 
  ∆ ln (LE) -6.36 0.000 
  ∆ Modified LE -5.536 0.000 
 
Notes: for all series, interpolated DF critical values are: 1% significance level = -4.026; 5% = -3.444; 10% = -3.144. ∆ denotes first 
differences. 
Felice, Pujol Andreu & D’Ippoliti: GDP and life expectancy in Italy and Spain over the long run 
864 http://www.demographic-research.org 
Table A-6: Granger‒causality tests allowing for potential endogeneity:  
Two-step regression results  
 
First step regressions 
 
GDP 
  
Modified LE 
 
Spain Italy France 
  
Spain Italy France 
LE (t-1) 0.572 -0.095 0.270   GDP (t-1) 0.007 0.039 0.041 
  (0.164)*** (0.154) (0.140)* 
  
(0.009) (0.013)*** (0.010)*** 
LE (t-2) 0.646 0.125 0.377 
 
GDP (t-2) 0.015 0.033 0.037 
  (0.169)*** (0.156) (0.141)*** 
  
(0.009) (0.014)** (0.010)*** 
LE (t-3) 0.423 0.466 0.501 
 
GDP (t-3) 0.013 0.023 0.030 
  (0.175)** (0.161)*** (0.139)*** 
  
(0.009) (0.014) (0.010)*** 
LE (t-4) 0.331 0.566 0.515 
 
GDP (t-4) 0.028 0.018 0.019 
  (0.169)* (0.157)*** (0.136)*** 
  
(0.008)*** (0.013) (0.010)* 
∆ GDP (t-1) 2.038 1.834 1.774  ∆ LE (t-1) 
1.945 2.257 2.086 
  (0.131)*** (0.142)*** (0.137)*** 
  
(0.114)*** (0.132)*** (0.113)*** 
∆2 GDP (t-1) -2.103 -1.887 -1.623  ∆
2 LE (t-1) -1.825 -2.475 -2.002 
  (0.211)*** (0.231)*** (0.220)*** 
  
(0.183)*** (0.221)*** (0.173)*** 
∆3 GDP (t-1) 1.085 0.984 0.745  ∆
3 LE (t-1) 0.857 1.322 0.958 
  (0.148)*** (0.169)*** (0.149)*** 
  
(0.119)*** (0.152)*** (0.111)*** 
∆4 GDP (t-1) -0.224 -0.210 -0.146  ∆
4 LE (t-1) -0.161 -0.277 -0.185 
  (0.040)*** (0.048)*** (0.040)*** 
  
(0.029)*** (0.039)*** (0.027)*** 
Constant 0.010 0.013 0.009 
 
Constant 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
  
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
R2 0.882 0.815 0.898 
 
R2 0.761 0.714 0.797 
N 142 142 142   N 142 142 142 
  Second step regressions 
  GDP   
Modified LE 
  Spain Italy France   
Spain Italy France 
LE (t-1) 0.013 0.571 -0.084   GDP (t-1) 0.045 0.032 0.047 
  (0.331) (0.267)** (0.304)   (0.026)* (0.034) (0.036) 
GDP (t-1) 0.231 0.439 0.248 
 
LE (t-1) -0.286 0.001 -0.175 
  (0.085)*** (0.083)*** (0.095)*** 
  
(0.085)*** (0.084) (0.098)* 
GDP (t-2) -0.013 -0.145 -0.187 
 
LE (t-2) 0.095 0.279 -0.093 
  (0.086) (0.090) (0.084)** 
  
(0.084) (0.086)*** (0.087) 
GDP (t-3) 0.023 0.042 0.243 
 
LE (t-3) 0.033 0.007 0.040 
  (0.086) (0.090) (0.083)*** 
  
(0.086) (0.090) (0.085) 
GDP (t-4) 0.027 0.020 -0.111 
 
LE (t-4) 0.031 -0.154 0.138 
  (0.084) (0.082) (0.085) 
  
(0.083) (0.087)* (0.086) 
Constant 0.014 0.008 0.014 
 
Constant 0.005 0.004 0.005 
  (0.005)*** (0.004)* (0.006)** 
  
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)** 
R2 0.055 0.214 0.096 
 
R2 0.133 0.081 0.027 
N 142 142 142   N 142 142 142 
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Table A-7: Bai‒Perron tests for structural breaks 
 Breaks 0 1 2 3 4 5 
GDP Spain RSS 0.143 0.109 0.099 0.093 0.085 0.085 
  BIC -587.4 -607.8 -601.5 -590.6 -583.7 -565.3 
  
Years 
  1937 1950, 1976 
1915, 1937, 
1959 
1915, 1937, 
1959, 1981 
1883, 1915, 
1937, 1959, 
1981 
GDP Italy RSS 0.338 0.271 0.239 0.219 0.216 0.269 
  BIC -460.2 -472.6 -471.3 -464.3 -446.2 -394.2 
  
Years 
 1944 1945, 1970 
1923, 1945, 
1970 
1900, 1923, 
1945, 1970 
1882, 1905, 
1928, 1950, 
1974 
GDP France RSS 0.241 0.184 0.166 0.151 0.149 0.207 
  BIC -510.3 -530.3 -525.0 -519.6 -501.0 -432.7 
  
Years 
  1946 1924, 1946 
1924, 1946, 
1973 
1898, 1924, 
1946, 1973 
1896, 1918, 
1942, 1964, 
1986 
LE Spain RSS 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
  BIC -1053.9 -1087.0 -1086.3 -1076.3 -1064.7 -1045.5 
  
Years 
 1941 1918, 1941 
1891, 1918, 
1941 
1891, 1918, 
1941, 1963 
1891, 1918, 
1941, 1963, 
1986 
LE Italy RSS 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 
  BIC -934.0 -953.1 -955.8 -945.4 -927.7 -902.6 
  
Years 
  1944 1920, 1986 
1920, 1944, 
1986 
1898, 1920, 
1944, 1986 
1898, 1920, 
1942, 1964, 
1986 
LE France RSS 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 
  BIC -899.5 -912.0 -908.5 -893.3 -882.4 -854.0 
  
Years 
  1946 1946, 1986 
1916, 1946, 
1986 
1893, 1915, 
1946, 1986 
1893, 1915, 
1942, 1964, 
1986 
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Table A-8: Prados de la Escosura tests for exogenous breaks 
 
Spain:  
break 1937 
Spain:  
break 1941 
Italy: 
break 1947 
Italy:  
break 1944 
France:  
break 1946 
 Modified LE 
Mod. LE (t-1) -0.509 -0.403 -0.052 -0.067 -0.316 
  (0.123)*** (0.112)*** -0.101 -0.106 (0.099)*** 
Mod. LE (t-2) -0.256 -0.173 0.126 0.139 -0.217 
  (0.135)* -0.119 -0.102 -0.109 (0.107)** 
Mod. LE (t-3) -0.159 -0.136 -0.131 -0.043 0.037 
  -0.134 -0.119 -0.103 -0.111 -0.11 
Mod. LE (t-4) -0.139 -0.146 -0.368 -0.301 0.218 
  -0.121 -0.115 (0.105)*** (0.111)*** (0.105)** 
Break 0.004 0.01 0.002 0.008 0.009 
  -0.003 (0.003)*** -0.004 (0.003)** (0.005)* 
Break * M. LE (t-1) 0.323 0.044 -0.085 -0.002 0.409 
  (0.171)* -0.174 -0.18 -0.174 (0.189)** 
Break * M. LE (t-2) 0.441 0.22 0.236 0.18 0.268 
  (0.180)** -0.183 -0.177 -0.173 -0.181 
Break * M. LE (t-3) 0.024 -0.069 0.316 0 -0.172 
  -0.183 -0.184 (0.186)* -0.176 -0.18 
Break * M. LE (t-4) 0.14 0.094 0.442 0.239 -0.251 
  -0.174 -0.173 (0.178)** -0.175 -0.179 
Constant 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 
  (0.002)*** (0.001)** (0.002)* -0.002 -0.002 
R2 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 
N 143 143 143 143 143 
  GDP 
GDP (t-1) -0.067 0.105 0.395 0.14 0.095 
  -0.123 -0.097 (0.117)*** -0.151 -0.099 
GDP (t-2) -0.169 -0.135 -0.332 -0.103 -0.127 
  -0.123 -0.098 (0.124)*** -0.158 -0.102 
GDP (t-3) 0.035 -0.064 -0.197 0.105 0.209 
  -0.123 -0.099 -0.134 -0.158 (0.101)** 
GDP (t-4) -0.14 -0.154 -0.213 -0.098 -0.015 
  -0.124 -0.1 -0.149 -0.163 -0.104 
Break 0.013 0.006 0.001 0.02 0.029 
  -0.009 -0.012 -0.011 (0.009)** (0.014)** 
Break * GDP (t-1) 0.436 0.181 0.156 0.405 0.341 
  (0.169)** -0.206 -0.178 (0.185)** (0.193)* 
Break * GDP (t-2) 0.173 0.21 0.346 -0.11 -0.302 
  -0.175 -0.209 (0.179)* -0.2 (0.180)* 
Break * GDP (t-3) -0.2 0.003 0.267 -0.189 0.117 
  -0.175 -0.209 -0.182 -0.201 -0.185 
Break * GDP (t-4) 0.262 0.397 0.294 0.167 -0.31 
  -0.168 (0.189)** -0.183 -0.193 (0.173)* 
Constant 0.01 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.003 
  -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 
R2 0.18 0.15 0.3 0.27 0.18 
N 143 143 143 143 143 
 
